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Honeypots have cemented their place as a tool used by organizations to study and 
analyze the threats against their networks and to find the vulnerabilities within. The down 
side of using Honeypots is the extensive amount of data they produce, making it virtually 
impossible to analyze manually. Researchers have come up with different ways to identify 
malicious activities in the Honeypot data. In this thesis, we propose to use the clustering 
algorithms to improve on an existing entropy based scheme used for identifying malicious 
activities in Honeynet traffic. The existing scheme partially requires manual inspection of 
the output to identify the different malicious activities. In this work, we implemented two 
clustering algorithms namely Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with 
Noise (DBSCAN) and Hierarchical Clustering. Then, we applied these algorithms to 
datasets, i.e., PCAP traces, provided by the Honeynet organization. Our results were 
compared with those obtained by the earlier scheme, and they showed that the use of 
automatic clustering can produce similar results, as it was produced by manual 
inspection, with better time efficiency. 
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 شعيب أرشد محمد             :الاسم
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التهديدات ضد شبكاتهم عززت مصائد الشبكات مكانها كأداة تستخدمها المنظمات لدراسة وتحليل 
وللعثور على نقاط الضعف داخلها. إّن الجانب السلبي لاستخدام مصائد الشبكات هو الكمية الكبيرة 
للبيانات التي تنتجها، مما يجعل من المستحيل تحليلها يدويا.ً وقد توصل الباحثون إلى طرق مختلفة 
. في هذه الرسالة، إننا نستخدم خوارزميات لتحديد الأنشطة الخبيثة الناتجة عن بيانات مصائد الشبكة
التقسيم للتحسين على النظام الحالي القائم على تحديد الأنشطة الخبيثة في بيانات مصائد الشبكة. إن 
النظام السابق يتطلب جزئياً المعاينة اليدوية للبيانات لتحديد مختلف الأنشطة الخبيثة. لذلك نفذنا 
طبيقات المعتمدة على الكثافة مع الضوضاء والتقسيم الهرمي. ثم طبقنا خوارزمية التقسيم المكاني للت
هذه الخوارزميات على قواعد البيانات المقدمة من منظمة مصائد الشبكة. وتمت مقارنة نتائجنا مع 
نتائج النظام السابق حيث أظهرت أن استخدام التقسيم التلقائي يمكن أن يسفر عن نتائج مماثلة 
 المعاينة يدويا ًمع كفاءة أفضل وقت. ومشابهة للنتائج
 
  علوم ماجستير شهادة
  والمعادن للبترول فهد الملك جامعة
  ةالسعودي العربية المملكة ، الظهران
 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1                                                                                 
Introduction 
The Internet era has brought revolutionary changes to the way we communicate and 
exchange information. It has also increased our reliance on digital devices for 
communication, which makes us vulnerable to all the insecurities and threats of relying 
on the Internet. Decades ago, businesses use vaults and banks to hold their sensitive trade 
secrets and financial information. But now, a centralized data center holds all the 
sensitive and day-to-day information. This makes the network security an utmost priority 
for businesses. Any software used on the network has its own exploits and vulnerabilities, 
and hackers only need a single exploit to be able to access a system. And, they can even 
hide their tracks once they take control of the system. Honeypots are developed to track 
the activities of hackers and also to figure out which exploits hackers use to gain access 
of a system. Honeypots are useful tools but they may produce a very large amount of 
data, and analyzing this data becomes very difficult. In this work, we are developing a 
framework for automatic detection of anomalies through clustering techniques, from the 
data collected by Honeypots.  
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1.1  HONEYPOTS 
Lance Spitzner, introduced the concept of Honeynets and Honeypots [1]. A Honeypot 
is a computer software which is placed on the network with some intentional security 
holes. Honeypots do not have any production value to the network. The main task of the 
honeypot is to record every communication, to and from it, and mark it as suspicious. The 
key responsibilities of a Honeynet include data control, data capture, and data analysis 
[1]. A Honeynet is a network consisting of multiple Honeypots. A Honeynet is more 
complex in deployment and management, but it provides better and more reliable 
information about attacks. The idea behind deploying a Honeypot is that it will be 
targeted and compromised due to some network attack, and it will capture all the data 
packets sent and received during the attack. This will help to reconstruct the attack and 
understand the method and technique deployed by the attackers to compromise the 
system security. Figure  1-1 shows multiple Honeypots integrated as part of a network. 
Figure  1-2  shows the placement of a Honeypot inside the demilitarized zone (DMZ). 
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Figure ‎1-1 Diagram showing an integrated honeypot configuration 
 
 
Figure ‎1-2 High Interaction Honeypot working inside a DM 
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Z 
Spitzner [2] introduced two types of Honeypots, High Interaction Honeypots and Low 
Interaction Honeypots.  
- High Interaction Honeypots are real machines, same like other machines 
on the network, with all the software installed on them. And, they will even have some 
fake data. So, the hacker will not be able to identify whether it is a Honeypot or a real 
system. Figure  1-2 shows a high interaction Honeypot placed inside a DMZ. 
- Low interaction Honeypots, on the other hand, are software with 
emulated services and very small interaction interface. Hackers can still exploit the 
vulnerabilities but they will not be able to control the machine after a successful attack.  
 There are currently different software packages available in the market which can 
provide the functionality of a Honeypot such as Nepenthes, Honeywall, HoneyD, 
Dionaea, etc. The difficulty associated with Honeypots is that they gather too much data 
and it can be of very different types, i.e., http, icmp, ftp, etc. Working with this extensive 
and varying types of data can create a lot of problems for the system analysts [3]. 
Figure 1-3 shows the different tools available as honeypots. 
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Figure‎1-3 Different tools used by the Honeynet Community [4] 
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1.2  DATA MINING AND ANOMALY DETECTION 
Data mining approaches applied to the network data can be classified into two 
different categories, misuse detection and anomaly detection. Misuse detection mainly 
focuses on detecting the known attacks and their variations. It tends to have very low 
false positive rate, mostly due to the attack signatures of the known attacks. On the other 
hand, anomaly detection techniques focus on the abnormalities in the network data which 
are deemed to be suspicious. These techniques can produce a large number of false 
positives due to the absence of any defined rules of abnormalities. However, anomaly 
detection has the ability to detect a zero-day attack, which is not possible with the misuse 
detection techniques. Misuse detection techniques are mostly used for real time analysis 
and detection by most of the antivirus tools and firewalls. On the other hand, anomaly 
detection techniques are usually used on the data collected during a network attack, but 
this detection is not achieved in real time. The reason behind anomaly detection 
techniques not being able to work in real time is that they usually need a certain time 
window to process the data and then identify its nature, whether it is normal or malicious. 
But in a real time environment, we cannot hold the data for the whole time window 
period, as it will greatly degrade the network performance.  
Anomaly detection techniques are mostly based on either clustering or outlier 
detection. Clustering is the process of grouping data points together so that all data points 
with similar attributes can be grouped into the same cluster. Outlier detection is the 
process of identifying the data points which deviate considerably from regions of high 
density data points or other clusters. Figure 1-4 shows clusters and outliers. Clustering and 
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outlier detection are both used for anomaly detection, but their use is mostly defined by 
the type of network traffic to which they are applied. If we want to apply anomaly 
detection techniques to normal network data, which also contains some intrusions, 
clustering will provide mostly the clusters of normal traffic or legitimate traffic, while 
outlier detection will provide the events which are not normal. And in this case, these 
outliers will be the network intrusions or some other type of attacks. So, if we want to 
apply the same techniques to the Honeynet data, then the term normal traffic will be 
redefined because all traffic coming to a Honeynet is considered suspicious. For 
Honeynet data, the majority of data does not represent normal or legitimate traffic. In the 
case of Honeynet traffic, clustering will provide us with different types of attacks; each 
attack is confined into a single cluster. Sometimes, instances of normal or legitimate 
traffic can also form a cluster, this mostly happens due to the presence of broadcast traffic 
in the network. But these clusters are easily identifiable due to their unique nature. In this 
case, an outlier can be one of two things, either an instance of normal traffic, or some 
attack which has not been seen before in the training set, including zero day attacks. To 
correctly identify the normal traffic, either in the form of cluster or outlier, we use known 
datasets for training purposes, so that the characteristics of the normal traffic can be 
identified correctly.  
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Figure‎1-4 Clusters (A and B) and Outliers (O1) 
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CHAPTER 2                                                                                          
Problem Statement 
2.1  BACKGROUND 
Anomaly detection refers to finding data patterns that do not conform to the expected 
normal data behavior. These data patterns which do not conform to the expected normal 
data behavior are referred to as outliers, anomalies, peculiarities, etc.; but the names 
outlier and anomaly are more commonly used in the literature. The importance of 
anomaly detection techniques first came to light when these techniques were used in 
detecting frauds in health care, insurance, and credit card. Anomaly detection got more 
prominence most recently through their extensive use in the intrusion detection systems, 
military surveillance equipment, and fault detection in critical systems [5].  
The main reason for the focus on the anomaly detection techniques is the fact that 
anomalies represent significant actionable information in the presence of very large 
datasets, i.e., data which needs human data analyzers attention. This happens in systems 
where anomaly detection is used to raise only alarms for anomalies but are not allowed to 
take actions. For instance, if applied to a credit card system, anomalies may lead to the 
detection of credit card misuse or identity theft. Also, anomalies in the bio-imagery of 
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human body may reveal some disease or tumor. And similarly, anomalies in the computer 
network may lead to the detection of already infected or hacked computer systems. 
Anomalies exist in a dataset due to a variety of reasons, but one thing which is common 
about anomalies is that they are useful for the data analyst. Their usefulness for the data 
analysts leads to the increased efficiency when dealing with very large datasets, as these 
anomalies point to the data analyst to where to look for the interesting information. 
Anomaly detection is sometime compared with noise removal or noise 
accommodation [6]. Noise is the unwanted data which affects the data analysis process. 
Noise removal is the process of removing this unwanted data from a large dataset, while 
in noise accommodation we create a statistical estimation model to normalize the effect 
of noise in the dataset. Noise and anomaly are similar in a way that both deviate from the 
normal data, but noise is a hindrance to the existing data and it should be removed or 
accommodated. However, anomaly is part of the data which represents abnormality, but 
it should not be removed or accommodated as anomalies tend to lead to important events.  
Another aspect of the anomaly detection is the novelty detection [7]. Novelty 
detection is the process of detecting previously unseen groups of anomalous events. 
Novelty detection techniques are used to detect those patterns which are unavailable in 
the training dataset. The purpose of the novelty detection is to update the database of 
known anomalies; therefore we do not have to go back to the training dataset whenever a 
new anomalous, previously unseen, pattern is observed in the dataset. The difference 
between anomaly detection and novelty detection is that anomaly detection only detects 
the anomalous events based on the database of known anomalies created during the 
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training phase. Novelty detection not only detects the known anomalies, but it also 
updates the database if it finds an unknown anomaly in the dataset. 
2.2  ASPECTS OF ANOMALY DETECTION 
In this section, we will discuss the different aspects and challenges related to the 
anomaly detection process.  
  2.2.1  Nature of Input Data 
One of the significant aspects of anomaly detection is the nature of the input data. The 
input mostly consists of data instances (also known as observations, vector, point, record, 
sample, entity, etc.) [8]. Each data instance can be represented by using different 
attributes (also known as dimensions, variable, feature, characteristic, field, etc.). These 
attributes mostly represent the values in the binary or numerical form. Each data 
observation may consist of a single feature (uni-variate) or multiple features 
(multivariate). In the case of multivariate data features, these features can be of the same 
type or a combination of different types of data. 
The nature of input data plays an important role in the selection of the anomaly 
detection technique, as each anomaly detection technique is designed for a certain type of 
input data [8]. Most of the anomaly detection techniques assume that all the features of a 
data instance are independent of each other, but in some techniques, we can combine 
some features for better detection. To combine different features, there should be some 
existing relationship between the data features. These data relations can include sequence 
data where all members can be arranged sequentially, graph data where each member can 
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be presented as vertices which are connected to each other through edges, or spatial data 
where data members are similar to each other, e.g., vehicular data.  
In our work, we will be using network trace files in PCAP format as input to the 
anomaly detection system.  
  2.2.2  Types of Anomalies 
An anomaly is referred to as a point anomaly if a single data instance can define the 
anomalous event independently [8]. This type of anomaly is mostly used when a single 
event of abnormality has a very high significance. The most common use of this type of 
anomaly detection is in fraud detection for credit cards, as any single transaction is 
important in detecting the anomalous credit card activity.  
An anomaly is referred to as contextual anomaly if a certain data instance is 
anomalous in a specific context [8]. It is quite possible that the same data instance, but 
with a different context or behavior, is considered normal or non-anomalous. In these 
techniques, the anomalous behavior is determined based on the values of contextual and 
behavioral elements in that specific context. The most common use of contextual 
anomalies is in time-series data and spatial data. For example, a credit card transaction 
late in the night or early morning, even of a small amount, can be considered anomalous 
if it does not coincide with the normal behavior. But, a similar transaction in other times 
of the day can be considered normal.  
An anomaly is referred to as collective anomaly if a collection of data instances is 
anomalous with respect to the complete dataset [8]. It is important to note that these data 
instances are not anomalous individually, but as a collection they are anomalous. For 
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instance, a single instance of zero values is not considered anomalous, but a collection of 
4-5 zero values will raise an anomalous flag. The reason behind the collective anomaly is 
that if a single event differs from the normal behavior, we can consider this as a mistake 
by the user; but if there is a set of events which differ from the normal behavior, then it is 
considered as an anomalous event that needs further investigation. The techniques used 
for collective anomalies are more difficult to implement as compared to the other two 
types of anomalies discussed earlier. The difficulty is mostly due to checking the 
presence of a collection of points instead of a single point. 
In our work, we will focus on collective anomaly detection, because all network 
attacks consist of a group of packets sent to the target machine.  
  2.2.3  Data Labels 
Data labeling is a process in which data instances are labeled as normal traffic or 
anomalous traffic. Labeling is mostly done by the human analysts in order to provide the 
labeled training dataset. But having a labeled training dataset does not provide the 
complete solution since sometime there are anomalies for which there is no labeled data 
for the training purpose. These anomalies are mostly dynamic in nature and their pattern 
is always changing, making it very difficult to label. The availability or unavailability of 
a labeled dataset determines the mode of operation for the anomaly detection techniques. 
The following three modes of operation are discussed in the literature. 
The Supervised anomaly detection mode is based on the assumption that the labeled 
training dataset is available [8]. Techniques based on supervised anomaly detection create 
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a predictive model based on the training dataset; then they use this model to determine 
the anomalies in the unknown dataset. 
The Semi-Supervised anomaly detection mode is based on the assumption that the 
training dataset only contains labeling for the normal traffic [8]. Techniques based on 
semi-supervised anomaly detection create a normal behavior profile from the training 
dataset. This normal behavior profile helps to determine the nature of any new data 
instance; either it will be considered normal if it matches the existing profile or it will be 
marked anomalous if it does not match any existing normal behavior. 
The Un-supervised anomaly detection mode is based on the assumption that the 
training dataset is not labeled [8]. The only assumption made is that the number of 
instances of normal traffic will be much more than the anomalous traffic.  
In our work, we will be using the supervised anomaly detection mode, in which we 
will initially train our technique on a training dataset. Once we have the threshold values 
for the training datasets, then we will apply these thresholds to the unknown datasets.   
  2.2.4  Output 
The final step of any anomaly detection technique is to provide the output of the 
detection process. The following are two methods that are most commonly used in the 
literature to represent the output of an anomaly detection technique. 
The Score based output techniques use an anomaly score of each data instance 
representing the degree of irregularity to the normal behavior. This will help the task of 
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the data analyst by first looking at the top anomalies, or by defining a cut-off point for the 
anomaly score to find the top list of anomalies. 
The Label based output technique labels each data instance as normal or anomalous. 
In our work, we will provide label based output, in which we will mark the clusters as 
different types of malicious activities.  
2.3  MOTIVATION 
Anomaly detection is the process of detecting patterns of events which do not 
coincide with the normal behavior of the data. In the last decade, we have seen a dramatic 
increase in the amount of data collected for various purposes. Therefore, it becomes more 
important and challenging to find the abnormalities or unusual events in the collected 
data. These events can lead to the detection of some unwanted data, e.g., intrusion 
detection in network traffic, or of something very useful such as the discovery of a new 
star in astronomical data. In both cases, anomaly detection helps in gaining the in-depth 
knowledge about the system and the way abnormalities work within that system. The task 
of anomaly detection becomes more important when there is a certain action associated 
with the detection of unusual events. For instance, in the case of fraud detection in credit 
card, whenever there is a fraud detected, all concerned parties and law enforcement 
agencies are notified so that they can take an appropriate action.  
An important challenge when developing an anomaly detection technique is the 
unavailability of the labeled data. Therefore, most of the time, we work in an 
unsupervised anomaly detection mode, in which we do not have the information about 
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the number of anomalies in the data, and we detect anomalies after they are classified by 
the clustering algorithm. For unsupervised anomaly detection mode, we provide the 
dataset to the clustering algorithm, which creates the clusters based on the similarities 
between the values of traffic features in the dataset. Once the clusters are created, we 
study them to identify the type of anomaly they are representing.  
When we have to apply anomaly detection techniques to a dataset provided by any 
honeypot, the task becomes more challenging. Here, we not only have to look for the top 
anomalous events or top outliers as in the case of normal network traffic where we were 
only interested in the outliers, but also for certain common behaviors too. In normal 
traffic, common behaviors are considered legitimate as most of the traffic is legitimate. 
However, in case of honeypots, common behaviors are considered anomalous as most of 
the traffic in a honeypot is attack traffic. This is due to the fact that, in the case of a 
honeypot, all the traffic coming to it is considered suspicious. Therefore, when analyzing 
honeypot network traffic, we need to focus on both aspects of anomaly detection, 
clustering and outlier detection. Clustering is important for honeynet traffic as most of the 
data will be categorized into different clusters, and these clusters will help in identifying 
the different types of attacks. In clustering, the goal is always to define clusters in such a 
way that each cluster represents a specific set of events or in our case specific malicious 
activities, which share some similarities or represent similar kind of traffic. Ideally we are 
interested in creating clusters such that each cluster represents a specific type of attack. 
Hence, the task of any anomaly detection technique for honeypot data is to classify all the 
known attacks by comparing current values of the clusters to the threshold values from 
the known anomalies database. 
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2.4  SCOPE OF WORK 
The main objective of this thesis work is to analyze the network data produced by 
honeypots. As this research work is strictly focused on detecting anomalies in the 
honeynet data, our scope will be limited to the data collected by honeypots.  And, another 
important assumption which we made for this research work is the presence of the 
malicious activities in the network traffic. Since we are using clustering techniques, we 
need at least one anomaly to build a cluster around it. All the network traffic input files 
which we used for this research work contain at least one malicious activity. In addition, 
our proposed technique will only be applicable for offline data analysis. Since we will be 
using five minute sliding time windows to calculate the entropy values for the identified 
traffic features, this scheme is inefficient for real time environment. This is acceptable for 
our work because honeypots are not developed for real time protection of the network. 
The responsibility of the honeypot is to study the nature of attacks and help to build 
counter measures for future attacks on the network. 
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CHAPTER 3                                                                                        
Literature Survey 
This chapter contains the study conducted to understand the current state of research 
about the Honeypots, anomaly detection for the honeypot data, and the clustering 
schemes used to detect and identify the anomalies in the honeypot data. The first step in 
any Honeypot design is the deployment technique. The second step is the data collection 
phase, and finally the data analysis phase. The deployment and data collection phases are 
important as they pave the way for the most important phase, which is the data analysis 
phase. Hacker’s activities can be tracked by using the raw data captured by the 
Honeypots. However, this task can be very time consuming if we do not use the tools 
designed for automated analysis. The biggest challenge for the data analyst is to deal with 
the data overload, mostly caused by the amount of data or sometimes by the varying 
types of data collected by honeynets [9]. Honeynets are known by researchers due to their 
ability to expose vulnerabilities in networks and systems by recording the attacks against 
them. 
This chapter is divided into two sections; the first section contains the current state of 
Honeypots and detection of anomalous activities and the second section focuses on the 
data mining and clustering techniques used for honeypot data analysis. 
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3.1  ANOMALY DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
Anomaly detection techniques are very different from the signature-based detection 
techniques. Signature-based detection techniques are mostly based on a pre-defined set of 
activities, while anomaly detection techniques check for any irregularities or 
dissimilarities in the data. Anomaly detection has played an important role in various 
sections of network security and intrusion detection. Anomaly detection techniques are 
very helpful in detecting different kinds of attacks like [10]: 
- Different types of buffer overflow with shell code 
- New attacks based on various exploits 
- Variants of already known attacks  
The current existing techniques can be categorized into two major types. 
1- Traffic feature based detection techniques   [11] [12] 
Traffic features based techniques are those techniques which use the IP 
header information to detect anomalies. The IP header information 
includes the Source IP, Destination IP, Source port, Destination port, and 
sequence number. An important performance constraint associated with 
the feature based detection techniques is that they require the header 
inspection to get the information needed. Header inspection can be a time 
consuming process, making traffic feature based techniques very difficult 
to use in a real-time situation. 
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2- Traffic volume based detection techniques [13-16]  
Traffic volume based detection techniques are useful when there is a very 
high change in the volume of network traffic. This volume can be defined 
by the amount of data bytes sent or received, or it can be the number of 
packets sent and received in each direction. Volume based detection 
techniques are good in detecting Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and 
certain types of flooding attacks. But they cannot perform well against 
exploit or shell code based attacks.  
Lakhina et al. [11] proposed an anomaly detection method in which they stated that 
anomalies in the network traffic can be detected by the distribution of traffic features 
such as IP addresses and ports. They stated that a wide range of anomalies can be tracked 
down by traffic feature distribution along with entropy. They experimented on the whole 
network traffic as it has different types of normal and abnormal traffic. The authors 
observed that in a wide set of data, classifying the nature of anomalies is a demanding 
task as they are constantly changing. As the anomalies are fluctuating on a regular basis, 
it is not appropriate to use pre-determined anomaly thresholds in a procedure for 
detecting anomalies. The distributional features of traffic like IP addresses and port 
numbers are very helpful in detecting numerous anomalies. The main difference between 
the work proposed by Lakhina et al. [11] and the work proposed by Dainotti et al. [14] 
and Haggerty et al. [15]is that Lakhina et al. introduced a method of using traffic features 
such as IP addresses and ports to track down the anomalies, in contrast to the other two 
methods [14] [15] which use traffic volume to track down the anomalies. They argued 
that there is a limited number of anomalies which cause a noticeable change in the 
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volume based features, but significantly large number of anomalies can be detected by 
using their proposed feature based anomaly detection technique. The authors adopted the 
following traffic features: Source and Destination IP addresses, Source port, and 
Destination port. To isolate the normal and abnormal anomalies, they follow the Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA), which uses dimensionality reduction. 
Nychis et al. [12] proposed an anomaly detection technique by using entropy values. 
For anomaly detection, their main focus was on examining the performance by analyzing 
different traffic features and behavioral features distributions. The behavioral features 
contain the degree of distribution, measuring the number of individual Source and 
Destination IP addresses. They found, after conducting various experiments, that the 
distributions  of Source IP, Destination IP, and port address all produce the same 
behavior towards the detection of known anomalies. Authors stated that behavioral and 
flow size distributions are not related to each other and their combination is very useful in 
detecting anomalies which are not detected by the address and port distributions. To 
detect the similarities between different feature pairs, the authors used entropy values to 
detect the relationship between different feature pairs.  The authors concluded that the 
traffic feature distribution should not only be limited to port/address features, and that 
more features can be added to increase the detection results. 
Kind et al. [17] presented a new theory regarding the feature based anomaly detection 
of Lakhina et al. [11]. They proposed a graphical method, i.e., histograms, to detect the 
anomalies. The authors constructed histogram patterns of different features. To track 
down the anomalies, they find different histogram patterns for different anomalies. The 
detection of anomalies is achieved in four levels: choosing features and creating 
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histograms, mapping histograms into a metric space, clustering and extracting patterns, 
and then identifying the anomalies. In this research, the authors employed different traffic 
features including port numbers, TCP flags, Source and Destination ports etc. The 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is employed for dimensionality reduction. Lakhina 
et al. [11] used PCA to distinguish between normal and abnormal traffic. This approach 
uses the histogram instead of entropy in order to track down the anomalies.  
Ping and Abe [16] proposed an anomaly detection technique to detect Denial of 
Service attacks by using Packet size entropy. The authors stated that packets are assigned 
fixed sizes by default in numerous applications when dealing with initial data request and 
response messages. For example, the FTP application has by default reserved 40 bytes for 
acknowledgement and 1500 bytes for full packet data. The packets which are produced, 
even in the attack, are of the same size. From the normal non-attack traffic data, the 
threshold of the entropy is calculated and an entropy value is assigned to the threshold. 
Once they have calculated the threshold values for the normal traffic, the task is then to 
examine when entropy values exceed the threshold value, and this will be considered as 
an attack. This research work allows for tracking down short term as well as long term 
attacks. Hence, it is an advanced approach in detecting the anomalies as compared to the 
volume-based schemes. 
Al-Haidari et al. [18] proposed an entropy-based solution to protect firewalls against 
DoS attacks. They used packet size entropy and compared it with pre-defined threshold 
values to determine the nature of incoming traffic. Based on these values, they were able 
to identify the DoS attacks targeting firewalls among the normal network traffic. Based 
on their experimentation, they showed that the entropy based scheme leads to high 
23 
performance improvements in firewalls by isolating the DoS attacks from the normal 
traffic. This also led to the increase of the throughput, the decrease in the delay, and the 
high availability of firewalls. 
Sqalli et al. [19] developed a technique based on entropy and volume values of 
selected features for classifying malicious activities in Honeynet traffic. Initially, they 
experimented with different combinations of the proposed entropy-based features such as 
IP address and port number, as well as volume-based features such as number of packets 
and total number of bytes. Based on their results, they decided to use a combination of 
three entropy-based features and two volume-based features for effective and efficient 
anomaly detection. The three entropy-based features are: 
- Destination Port Entropy 
- Source Port Entropy  
- Destination IP Entropy 
And the two volume based features are: 
- Total Payload Bytes 
- Packet Count 
Entropy can be described as a measure of uncertainty or randomness associated with 
a random variable, or in the case of Honeynets, it will be the randomness associated with 
a specific feature of the data entering or leaving the network. Entropy is mostly used to 
find the deviation in the data items, and these deviations can help in detecting anomalies. 
Entropy H(X) is defined by equation [3-1]. 
 ( )    ∑  (  )      (  )
 
                                       [‎3-1] 
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Where:  
 (  )  
                                           
                      
      [‎3-2] 
Sqalli et al. [19] used five minute sliding windows to calculate the entropy for the 
selected features. They also used the same window size to calculate the volume-based 
features. After studying the relationship of these features with the known malicious 
activities in the training dataset, they were able to identify different threshold values for 
different kind of attacks. Then, they applied these threshold values to other traffic traces 
provided by the Honeynet community. The limitation of this technique is that once the 
entropy and volume values are computed for any honeynet trace, thresholds have to be 
manually found against these measured entropy and volume values. The manual 
determination of thresholds increases the chances of accurately detecting an anomaly, but 
it also significantly decreases the efficiency of the technique. Our work is based on this 
technique, but it automates the detection and identification process. 
3.2  CLUSTERING TECHNIQUES FOR ANOMALY DETECTION 
Barbar et al. [20] presented and implemented an Audit Data Analysis and Mining 
(ADAM) system. ADAM is based on anomaly detection in a large dataset. The authors’ 
proposed approach is to use a combination of the association of rule mining and 
classification mining techniques. Initially, ADAM is applied to the training data to create 
a normal usage profile for the data during an attack free period. Then, the algorithm is 
applied to the known attacks dataset to create an association rule profile for the known 
attacks. ADAM is designed to work as a real time anomaly detection tool, but its training 
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phase is performed on offline known data. Then, it is placed online with the profiles of 
known attack patterns and the normal usage. ADAM will monitor the incoming data in 
the form of a sliding window to match the incoming data patterns to already known ones. 
Any unknown pattern will be marked as suspicious and will be separated along with all 
its related information for further analysis. 
Thonnard et al. [21] applied data mining techniques to the honeypot data to develop 
attack signatures of distributed and polymorphic attacks. This work relies on a quality-
based clustering technique specifically designed to identify the groups of similar attacks. 
The technique used is applied to the data collected by the honeynet, and depends on the 
“time series” clustering. The time series is a graphical plot of the time against the sum of 
Source count for any specific type of attack. The authors used a graph-based approach to 
define and formulate the problem. The Symbolic Aggregate Approximation (SAX) 
method is used to find the similarity distance for different time series graphs. SAX tends 
to approximate different time series by segmenting them into time intervals of equal size 
and summarizing each of these intervals by their mean values and then comparing these 
values against the known anomalies. Figure  3-1presents two different attacks on separate 
ports having similar time series graphs.  
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Figure ‎3-1 Two different attacks observed on two different sensors showing same time series [21] 
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Jin et al. [22] applied the knowledge discovery techniques on the data produced by a 
Honeynet. They developed their own technique and named it K-Nearest neighbor Outlier 
Factor (KNOF) which is the combination of two other techniques K-Nearest Neighbor 
(KNN) [23] and Local Outlier Factor (LOF) [24]. The algorithm is divided into two 
major parts; the first part is visualizing the data, and the second part is identifying the 
outliers. For the visualization purpose, they used the Ordering Points to Identify the 
Clustering Structure (OPTICS) algorithm [25].  
The working principal of OPTICS [25] is first to place data points into space, and 
these points can be based on multiple features, i.e., Source IP, Destination IP, port 
number, TTL, packet size, etc. Once all the data points have been placed into the space, 
then they will be categorized as a cluster or an outlier. To become a cluster, each point 
should have ‘k’ neighbors in its ‘Ԑ’ neighborhood. ‘k’ is defined as the minimum number 
of data points inside the specified maximum radius ‘Ԑ’. Data points outside the ‘Ԑ’ 
neighborhood will be declared as outliers. This technique, OPTICS, will provide an 
augmented ordering of the data according to its density based clustering. These types of 
techniques are very helpful in visualizing the high-dimensional data. For the outlier 
detection, the authors used two different techniques, K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and 
Local Outlier factor (LOF).  
KNN is a distance based outlier detection technique, while the LOF is a density based 
outlier detection technique. KNN does not need to have any prior knowledge of the 
dataset, as it bases its calculation on the distance value of the k
th
 nearest neighbor with 
reference to an object in the dataset. Initially, it will create a table containing each object 
in the dataset along with its k-distance, distance of the k
th
 neighbor from that object. 
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Then, this table will be sorted in descending order according to the k-distance. The first n 
objects in the table will be declared as outliers, where k and n are numbers defined by the 
user. The logic behind this assumption is the fact that sparse objects in the dataset have 
higher values of the k-distance than the objects in the dense neighborhood. As KNN takes 
the global view of the dataset to calculate the outliers, these outliers can be named as 
global outliers.  
The Local Outlier Factor (LOF) of an object ‘p’ is the ratio between the average local 
reachability densities of p’s k-nearest neighbors to the local reachability density of p. The 
local reachability density for any object ‘p’ is the inverse of the average reachability 
distance based on the k nearest neighbors of ‘p’. The reachability distance between an 
object ‘p’ and any other object ‘o’ is the maximum of the k-distance of ‘o’ and the 
distance between ‘p’ and ‘o’. Based on these two techniques, the authors developed their 
own technique called k-Nearest Outlier Factor (KNOF) and it is defined for an object ‘p’ 
as the product of p’s LOF and the average reachability distance of its k-nearest neighbors. 
The reason to take this product is that the difference between LOF and the average 
reachability distance can be up to three to four times the value of LOF. So, to give proper 
representation to both protocols, the authors used the product of the two values instead of 
addition. When KNOF of all the objects have been calculated, a table will be created 
according to the descending value of KNOF, and the first n objects will be declared as 
outliers, i.e., malicious, in terms of intrusion detection.  
Ghourabi et al. [26] presented a data analyzer for a honeypot router. A Honeypot 
router works as a honeypot, but with the added functionality of a router.  To analyze the 
output of the honeypot router, the authors suggested a data mining based data analyzer 
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which will find the suspicious packets and will separate them for further analysis. 
Initially, they compared three different data mining approaches, namely Density-Based 
Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) [27], Cobweb [28], and k-
mean [29]. They found that the DBSCAN approach has the minimum false positive rate, 
so they decided to use this scheme in their data analyzer.  
Ghourabi et al. [26] derived their algorithm based on DBSCAN such that they will 
apply this approach to all the data and will create clusters according to this approach. All 
elements which are not classified as core objects or density reachable will be considered 
suspicious. And, they will be separated for human analysis. Each point represents a 
unique feature of the data, and in their case, the authors selected the following features: 
Source IP, Destination IP, protocol, TTL, packet length, and type. 
Maheshwari et al. [30] discussed the limitations of the DBSCAN algorithm. The first 
limitation of DBSCAN is its inability to create clusters using time as a clustering 
parameter. Because the value of time increases linearly in the whole dataset, it is difficult 
to associate time with certain events and create clusters around it. The second limitation 
of DBSCAN is its inability to assign weights according to the density of the cluster. And 
it sometime fails to identify noise points between clusters of different densities. The next 
limitation is that DBSCAN clusters have different border densities inside a cluster. For 
very large databases, the memory requirement of DBSCAN becomes a problem as it has 
to process all the elements.  
In this literature review, we thoroughly studied the current status of anomaly 
detection techniques[11, 16-19], and we also studied the developments made in the 
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clustering techniques [20-26]. This helped us in developing a framework which utilizes 
both the anomaly detection techniques discussed in [18] [19] and the clustering 
techniques discussed in[22] [26]. Our study of anomaly detection techniques [11] [16] 
[19] showed us that Entropy values of different traffic features are found to be very 
helpful in detecting the anomalies in the Honeynet data. While the study of clustering 
techniques discussed in [20] [21] [25]helped in designing the automatic detection 
framework. In this thesis, we will use Entropy based anomaly detection techniques along 
with the clustering algorithms to automate the anomaly detection process.  
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CHAPTER 4                                                                                            
Proposed Solution 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
The idea of this thesis work is to automate the detection process of anomalies in the 
data collected by Honeypots. After studying different solutions, we are able to develop 
our own framework for the automatic detection of anomalies. In our framework we will 
take a dataset produced by a honeypot, and will use the selected traffic features for the 
calculation of entropy values. Once we have the entropy values, we will then use the 
selected features to create the clusters using the proposed clustering algorithms. After the 
clusters are created, the maximum and minimum values for each cluster will be compared 
with the detected values for the known anomalies. Then, cluster names will be assigned 
based on the similarities with the threshold limits of known anomalies. Figure  4-1 shows 
a comparison between the work of Sqalli et al. [19] and our proposed solution. We will 
experiment with density based clustering and hierarchical clustering as these two 
clustering schemes do not require the number of clusters as an input parameter. We do 
not want to fix the number of clusters in our research work as this will allow us to apply 
our technique to various types of network data where the output may not be a fixed 
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number of anomalies.  In this way, we can have different number of clusters based on the 
number of anomalies inside the dataset.  
 
 
Figure ‎4-1     (a) Existing work by Sqalli et al. [19]                                       (b) Our Proposed Solution 
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4.2  CLUSTERING 
Clustering is a process of grouping the data into similar groups or clusters, so that 
objects inside a cluster have high similarity in comparison to one another, but are very 
dissimilar to objects in other clusters. Dissimilarities are assessed based on the feature 
values describing the objects. Common features include distance, density, probability, 
etc. Clustering is also known as data segmentation in some applications, as it is used to 
partition large datasets according to certain similarity criteria. Clustering algorithms are 
used in various fields of science to manage large sets of data and information. There are 
some recommendations in the literature about choosing the best clustering algorithm for a 
particular dataset. The following are typical requirements of clustering in data mining [9]: 
 Scalability: Ability to perform well when applied to large datasets. High 
scalability in clustering is needed.  
 Ability to deal with different types of attributes: Data handling should not be 
limited to numerical data; an application may require the clustering algorithm to 
handle data other than numerical data.  
 Discovery of Clusters with arbitrary shape: A clustering algorithm should be 
able to detect clusters not only in the standard geometrical shapes but also in 
arbitrary shapes.  
 Minimal requirements for domain knowledge to determine input 
parameters:  The ability of a clustering algorithm to start the clustering process 
without having too much information about the dataset is also needed. And the 
output produced by the clustering algorithm should not be over reliant on the 
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input parameters provided by the users, because these parameters are not very 
easy to determine, and they may lead to biased results. These parameters can 
have either positive or negative effect on the results; this effect depends on the 
precision of the initial parameters. The output of some clustering algorithms is 
largely affected by the preciseness of the input parameters. For those clustering 
algorithms, performance solely depends on the accuracy of the input parameters.  
 Ability to deal with noisy data: A clustering algorithm’s performance should 
not be affected by the presence of noise in the dataset.  
 Incremental clustering and insensitivity to the order of input records: A 
clustering algorithm should be able to include new data to the existing clustering 
structure, instead of starting the whole clustering process again. And, the order of 
input data should not affect the outcome of the clustering process.  
 High dimensionality: A clustering algorithm should be able to perform with the 
same efficiency for the datasets with higher number of dimensions as it performs 
for the datasets with lower number of dimensions.  
 Constraint-based clustering: A clustering algorithm may also have to ability to 
add constraints before starting the clustering process. Different applications have 
different constraints for the clustering. 
4.3  CATEGORIZATION OF CLUSTERING METHODS 
There exist many clustering algorithms in the literature, but there is no fixed 
categorization of these clustering algorithms. Some clustering algorithms use multiple 
features to improve their output, which makes it difficult to categorize them into a single 
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category.  In general, the major clustering methods can be classified into the following 
categories: [9]  
 Partitioning Method: A partitioning method divides all the data points into k 
partitions, where k is a pre-defined number. Each partition is a cluster and 
satisfies the condition that each cluster contains at least one data point, and 
each data point should be part of only one cluster. The general criterion of a 
good partitioning is that objects in the same cluster are “close” or related to 
each other, whereas objects of different clusters are “far apart” or very 
different.  
 Hierarchical Method: Hierarchical clustering creates clusters by arranging 
all the elements into a specific hierarchy. This hierarchy can be built from 
bottom-up, as in the case of agglomerative clustering, or from top-down, as in 
the case of divisive clustering. In agglomerative clustering, each data point is 
assigned to a separate cluster, and then it will start merging the clusters based 
on the similarities between each other. It will stop when there will be only one 
cluster or when it will reach a pre-defined stopping condition. In divisive 
clustering, all the data points are assigned to the single cluster in the 
beginning. Then, we start breaking the large cluster into smaller ones, which 
are similar. Divisive clustering also requires a predefined stopping condition 
to halt the clustering process.  
 Density-based Method:  The majority of clustering algorithms are based on 
the distance between the data points, but these clusters are not helpful in 
creating arbitrary shaped clusters. In density based clustering, clusters are 
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created based on the density of data points close to the starting data point. And 
the cluster shape follows the density pattern in the “neighborhood”, instead of 
following a standard geometric shape. “Neighborhood” is defined by the 
presence of a minimum number of data elements in the pre-defined radius. 
DBSCAN and its extension, OPTICS, are the most common density based 
clustering algorithms.  
 Grid-based Method: In grid-based clustering, we first create a grid-like 
structure consisting of cells. And, each cell in the grid structure represents the 
data points from the given dataset. Each data point is the combination of all 
the selected features for that specific packet. The benefit of the grid-based 
clustering algorithms is the fast processing time, as these algorithms are 
independent of the number of data points. The grid-based clustering 
algorithms only depend on the number of cells in each dimension.  
 Model-based Method: In model based clustering, we first create a statistical 
model for each known type of cluster. And when we apply these algorithms to 
the datasets, it starts matching each cluster model with the incoming data. 
Incoming data is assigned to the clusters based on their similarity with the 
existing model. 
Out of these cluster categorizations, we have decided to use the density-based method 
and Hierarchical method. One reason for selecting density-based method and hierarchical 
method is that we do not know the exact number of anomalies or clusters in a given 
dataset. Secondly, the shape of the clusters formed can be arbitrary. In both density-based 
and hierarchical methods, we do not need to specify the number of clusters and these 
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methods can handle clusters with arbitrary shape. Therefore, density-based and 
hierarchical clustering methods are better suited for our requirements. In density based 
clustering, we are going to use the Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with 
Noise (DBSCAN). In Hierarchical clustering, we are going to use the agglomerative 
(bottom-up) clustering.  
4.4  DBSCAN 
The Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) [27] is 
a Clustering based algorithm. The idea of DBSCAN is that each cluster must contain a 
predefined minimum number of data points in its neighborhood. The minimum number 
of neighbors and the neighborhood radius are both predefined. Epsilon (Eps) is the 
maximum radius of the neighborhood. The maximum radius for any data point is defined 
as the maximum distance from that data point, considering it as the neighborhood center. 
The circular area surrounding a data point is called Eps-neighborhood for that data point. 
And MinPts is the minimum number of points in the Eps-neighborhood. The DBSCAN 
algorithm defines two sets of objects: core objects and density reachable. Core objects are 
those that contain MinPts in their Eps-neighborhood, and density reachable objects are 
those objects which exist inside an Eps of a core object, but do not have MinPts points. A 
data point can either be a single point, then it will be called directly density reachable as 
in Figure  4-2  (a), or it can be a chain of points such that each point is directly density 
reachable from another point, then the two points at the end of the chain are called 
density reachable as in Figure  4-2  (b). 
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Figure ‎4-2  (a)  p is directly density reachable from q                (b) p is density reachable from q [8] 
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4.5  HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING 
Another type of clustering that is also present in the literature is called Hierarchical 
clustering. It provides a hierarchy or a structure as an output, which gives us more 
information about all the clusters. Hierarchical clustering also shows, in the form of a 
hierarchical tree view, the order in which different data points are merged from the initial 
to the last merge operation, while  flat clustering cannot provide any information about 
merge operations performed during cluster formation. Algorithms used in Hierarchical 
clustering do not require the number of clusters as input, and most of these algorithms, 
which are also used in information retrieval, are deterministic. But, a drawback that is 
associated with the Hierarchical clustering is its inefficiency. This is due to the fact that 
Hierarchical clustering algorithms have quadratic complexity as compared to the linear 
complexity of the k-means or other flat clustering algorithms. Hierarchical clustering 
algorithms can be divided into two major categories [31]: 
1- Bottom-Up Clustering (Agglomerative Clustering) 
2- Top-Down Clustering (Divisive Clustering) 
Agglomerative Clustering starts by assigning each data point into a separate cluster 
and then building up clusters from the bottom. On the other hand, Divisive Clustering 
starts by assigning all data points into a single cluster, and then breaking them into 
smaller clusters based on some defined criteria. In our research work, we have 
focused on the Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering, as it is more flexible and it can 
operate with multiple clusters creation criteria. This flexibility of having multiple 
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criteria will help us in finding the best criterion for anomaly detection in addition to 
allowing us to fine tune the performance of the detection algorithm.  
  4.5.1  Agglomerative Clustering 
Agglomerative clustering is also known as the bottom-up clustering. In agglomerative 
clustering, initially each data point is assigned as a single cluster. Then, clusters which 
are similar to each other are merged. In every iteration, the clusters are merged based on 
the similarity between them. At the end of the clustering process, the hierarchy of the 
clusters can be viewed by a special type of graphs called “dendrogram”. In this graph, 
horizontal lines represent the merging of two clusters. The y-coordinate of these 
horizontal lines represent the value of similarity when they are merged, and this is called 
the combination similarity of the merged clusters. The similarity value depends on the 
criteria used to merge the clusters together. By going up in the dendrogram, we can 
reconstruct the history of all the mergers between the clusters. Figure  4-3 shows the 
dendrogram for the scan 14. 
A fundamental assumption in agglomerative clustering is that all the merging 
operations are monotonic. Monotony in the merging operations means that the sum of the 
combination similarities of both data points merging to form a new point should be equal 
to or greater than the combination similarity of the new point created after the merging. If 
this condition is not met, then the merge operation will be called inversion. Inversion 
does not affect the performance or throughput of the clustering algorithm, but it is used to 
identify an abnormal merge operation. Usually, a centroid linkage has one or two 
inversions, and these inversions simply show the irregularities in a merge operation. The 
reason is that in a centroid linkage all merge operations are non-weighted merges. When 
41 
a large centroid, containing large number of data points, is merged with a very small 
centroid, containing very few data elements, then it is possible that the new centroid may 
have a combination similarity greater than the sum of individual similarities of the 
centroids merging to form a new centroid. Figure  4-4 shows a non-monotonic 
dendrogram of scan-14. 
 
 
Figure ‎4-3 Dendrogram of Scan-14 
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Figure ‎4-4 Non-monotonic dendrogram of scan-14 
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The hierarchical cluster creation process has some similarities with the flat clustering, 
but it also offers options which are unique to the agglomerative clustering. As we 
have seen in Figure  4-3 , a dendrogram provides us with the hierarchy; but to create 
clusters, we need to define some cutoff criteria. The following three criteria are 
defined in the literature to create clusters [32]: 
 The first criterion is called natural clustering. In this method, we look for 
the maximum difference between two combination similarities before any 
merge operation, and then we break these maximum difference merge 
operations to create clusters.  
 In the second criterion, instead of going for the highest value of the 
difference between the individual similarities before the merge operation, 
we specify a certain value of the difference in individual similarity. Then, 
a cluster is created every time we encounter that the dissimilarity value is 
greater than the defined threshold.  
 In the third criterion, as in the flat clustering, we provide the number of 
clusters required. This option of providing the number of clusters is 
optional and it can be used to further enhance the performance and 
throughput of the anomaly detection technique. Clusters are created at the 
top of the dendrogram by dividing the whole tree into the required number 
of clusters.  
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  4.5.2  Linkages 
Linkages play an important role in the agglomerative clustering. Linkages are the 
functions which are used to create the similarities or dissimilarities between the data 
points. In general, the role of the linkages is to define the criteria by which the small 
clusters will be merged. There are four different types of linkages defined in the literature 
[31]. 
 Single linkage 
 Complete linkage  
 Average linkage 
 Centroid linkage 
In the single linkage case, when we need to take a decision about merge operations, 
we only look at the value of the data points which are closest to each other. Or in simple 
words, we look for the closest link between two clusters, and this value for the closest 
link will be used to determine the possible merge operations. Decisions based on the 
single linkage are mostly considered as local decisions as they do not take the global 
picture into account.  
In the complete linkage case, when we need to take a decision about the merge 
operations, we look at the value of the data points which are farthest from each other. Or 
in simple words, we look for the value of the farthest link between two clusters. This 
value will be used to determine the possible merge operations. The benefit of using the 
complete linkage is that the priority is given to the merge operations involving small 
clusters instead of merging big clusters first.  
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In the average linkage case, when we need to take a decision about the merge 
operations, we look at all the distance pairs in both clusters and take their average. Or 
simply, we can say that the average linkage is the average distance between all the data 
point pairs in both clusters. The average linkage helps us to overcome the shortcomings 
of the first two linkages as it does not only take into account the local perspective but the 
global one as well.  
In the centroid linkage case, when we need to take a decision about the merge 
operation, we first calculate the centroid or center of mass, which is the average of all the 
data points inside the cluster. Once we have calculated the centroids, then we will start 
merging those centroids that are closest to each other. Closeness is decided by the 
distance between the centroids. In contrast to the other three types, the centroid linkage is 
sometimes non-monotonic or it has inversion in its dendrogram. This non-monotonicity is 
due to the recalculation of a centroid before every merge operation. As centroids are not 
actual data points, and needed to be calculated every time, this sometime leads to an 
increase in the distance similarity, which shows as an inversion in the dendrogram. 
Figure  4-5 shows a graphical presentation of the linkages discussed above. 
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Figure ‎4-5 Linkages [32] 
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CHAPTER 5                                                                              
DBSCAN 
Density Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) [27]is 
density based clustering algorithm which we are going to use for this thesis work. Details 
of DBSCAN have been discussed in detail in Chapter 4. In this chapter we going to 
implement DBSCAN and then we will tune the input parameters for the DBSCAN and 
finally we will test the performance of DBSCAN on different network trace files. 
5.1  IMPLEMENTATION 
Our aim in this work is to improve the efficiency of the earlier scheme by Sqalli et al. 
[19] by the automatic creation of clusters. This will remove the need of manually 
identifying the malicious activities inside the Honeynet traffic.  For this purpose, we use a 
data mining based clustering algorithm namely Density Based Spatial Clustering of 
Applications with Noise (DBSCAN) [27].  
For implementation purposes, we use Microsoft Visual Studio 2010 to develop our 
DBSCAN program. This program takes a comma separated file as input, which contains 
five columns. Each column represents the entropy values of the selected features, i.e., 
Source port, and Destination port, Source IP, as well as the values of the packet count, 
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and total payload bytes. In addition to the input file, the program requires two more input 
parameters, MinPts and Ԑ (Eps). Based on the value of MinPts and Ԑ (Eps), our program 
will process the input data to create the clusters. And, it will provide the output in the 
form of clusters and noise. “Clusters” will contain the data elements belonging to them, 
and “noise” will contain the data elements which do not belong to any cluster. Microsoft 
Visual Studio does not support the 3-D scatter plots. So, for the purpose of plotting 
graphs and creating plots, we have used MATALB 2011R2. Figure  5-1 shows a snapshot 
of the DBSCAN program interface developed in Microsoft Visual Studio 2010. 
 
 
Figure ‎5-1 DBSCAN Program interface developed in Visual Studio 
 
  5.1.1  Parameter Tuning  
Choosing the best value of “MinPts” depends on the level of granularity required and 
the minimum number of points that should be available in each cluster. The maximum 
value of “MinPts” depends on the total number of data elements in the dataset. A suitable 
value of “Eps” will be the last dip or “valley” in the plot for any specific value of 
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“MinPts”, after which the plot line becomes almost a straight line [27]. Figure  5-2 shows 
the K-NN plot for the training dataset, i.e., Scan 28 Honeynet trace, with “MinPts”=2, 3, 
4, 5, 6. A suitable value of “Eps” can be found for each value of “MinPts”. . In 
Figure  5-2, if we choose the value of “MinPts” to be 2, then by following the blue line we 
can find the last dip in the curve, which is around 0.70 for Eps. Sqalli et al. [19] used 
entropy values for three traffic features, and all of these values are in the range of zero to 
20. Zero shows that there is no change in entropy and 20 shows the maximum change. 
However, the values of the two volume-based features were used by Sqalli et al. [19] 
rather than their entropy value, and the range for these values was much higher, e.g., 1 
KB to 500 KB for the Total Byte feature. The magnitude of these values complicated the 
cluster creation process as they are larger by orders of magnitude compared to the other 
three entropy-based values. Therefore, we normalize the two volume-based features by 
taking the logarithm (log) of their respective values. This way, we can easily create a 5-
dimensinal space and apply DBSCAN on all five features for creating clusters. Then, we 
analyze the output to find how many clusters exist, which represent the malicious 
activities, and compare the output to the results obtained by Sqalli et al. [19]. In 
summary, the five dimensions used are: the Destination Port Entropy, the Source Port 
Entropy, the Destination IP Entropy, the Log of the Total Payload Bytes, and the Log of 
the Packet Count. 
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Figure ‎5-2 KNN Plot for Scan-28 in Descending Order 
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5.2  EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We implemented our approach so that it can take the five parameters as input and 
then create a 5-dimensional space to apply the DBSCAN algorithm. We adjusted the 
values of “Eps” and “MinPts” to fine tune the cluster creation process. Finally, we obtain 
the clusters along with the data points falling into each cluster. Then, we plot these 
clusters in a 3-dimensional space, because of the limitation in plotting higher dimensions. 
For the plotting purposes, we used the following three dimensions: Destination Port 
Entropy, Source Port Entropy, and Destination IP Entropy. All clusters shown in the 3-D 
plots are created using all five parameters.  
For experimentation purposes, we used the same “Scan of the Month” traces which 
were used by Sqalli et al. [19]. These traces are taken from the “Scan of the Month” 
challenges available on the Honeynet Organization’s public website [33]. 
TABLE  5-1provides more detailed information about these traces. 
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TABLE ‎5-1 Honeynet Traffic Test Datasets 
Traffic Dataset Name 
& Source 
Traffic Details Description 
Scan 28 - Honeynet.org – 
Scan of the Month 
Day1: 18843 Packets – 24 
Hours 
Day 3: 123123 Packets – 24 
Hours 
Trace collected by the Mexico 
Honeynet Team, Italian blackhats 
break into a Solaris server then 
enable IPv6 tunneling for 
communications. 
Scan 14 - Honeynet.org – 
Scan of the Month 
6707 packets 
Total Duration 20 Hours 
This trace is about a successful 
Windows NT attack. 
Scan 19 - Honeynet.org – 
Scan of the Month 
24440 packets 
Total Duration 23 Hours 
Trace of Redhat Linux 6.2 
honeypot compromise. 
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  5.2.1  Scan 14 
Scan 14 is the first Honeynet trace used by Sqalli et al. [19], to identify malicious 
activities within, and 3 anomalies have been reported in this trace. When we run the 
DBSCAN clustering algorithm on the five output parameters, we obtained five clusters. 
Figure  5-3 shows the graphical output of the clusters for this trace. Out of these five 
clusters, Clusters 3, 4, and 5 exactly match the threshold of malicious activities found in 
[19]. Clusters 1 and 2 do not match any anomalous pattern defined in [19]. As explained 
earlier, clustering algorithms create clusters based on similarities between the selected 
traffic features. But, it is not necessary that all the clusters created will match the 
threshold values for the known attacks. The number of clusters produced is related to the 
level of granularity which we want from the data, so sometimes it will produce clusters 
which will not match any threshold of the known attacks. The tuning phase helps us 
identify the suitable values which will produce better detection and results. Each cluster 
is defined based on specific entropy and volume values for each traffic feature. Clusters 1 
and 2, which do not represent any reported malicious activity, can either be considered as 
noise or as a new attack for which there is no threshold available. If we use a switch level 
trace file, it always contains traffic to or from other hosts which are connected to the 
same switch along with the Honeypot; and in this case, we can safely assume that these 
clusters represent noise. However, if it is a Honeypot level trace file then we have to 
further investigate the cluster. Table  5-2 presents the anomalies detected by Sqalli et al. 
[19]. Table  5-3 presents the DBSCAN Clustering results with the minimum and 
maximum values for each traffic feature. Each cluster present in these tables is shown as 
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a combination of all the selected features, along with their maximum and minimum 
values, which are shown for each feature separately.  
 
Table ‎5-2 Scan-14 Anomalies detected by Sqalli et al. [19] 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
System 
Compromise 
3.15 3.56 3.065 4.465 0 1.84 4.0834 4.1452 2.1398 2.1818 
Malicous File 
Download 
X X X X X X 4.2254 4.8481 2.1613 2.2671 
Running 
Various 
Commands 
0 2.71 1 3.85 0 1.95 3.1179 3.9364 1.6532 2.0644 
 
Table ‎5-3 Scan -14 DBSCAN Clustering with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1 0 1.42 0 1.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cluster 2 0.81 0.92 0.81 0.92 0 0 1.79 1.87 0 0 
Cluster 3 1.08 2.66 1.08 3 0 1.48 3.37 4.85 1.11 2.74 
Cluster 4 3.25 3.64 3.66 4.49 0 0.44 4.92 5.31 2.66 2.82 
Cluster 5 2.43 3.26 3.06 3.67 1.4 2.31 4.61 5.47 2.1 2.79 
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Figure ‎5-3 Scan-14 3-D Clusters 
  5.2.2  Scan 19 
Scan 19 is the smallest trace used by Sqalli et al. [19], where three malicious 
activities were reported. DBSCAN created four clusters based on the values of the five 
features used. Figure  5-4 shows the graphical output of the clusters for this trace. Out of 
these four clusters, Cluster 3 represents a “System Compromise”, while Cluster 4 
represents two malicious activities, i.e., “Malicious File Download” and “Port Scan”. The 
reason for having two events in one cluster is that the minimum and maximum values for 
this cluster match with two threshold intervals presented by Sqalli et al. [19]. This 
problem of having a single cluster representing multiple anomalies is due to the fact that 
Sqalli et al. [19] used separate names for different anomalies falling under the category of 
a system compromise attack. System compromise attacks always involve exploiting some 
legitimate service with vulnerability by sending malicious requests to gain access. Most 
of the attacks which fall under the system compromise category show very similar 
behavior. The only difference is that as each service has its own vulnerabilities, the 
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number of malicious messages and size of those malicious messages is different for each 
attack. These anomalies are almost alike and their threshold values overlap for more than 
one selected feature. On the other hand, DBSCAN sometimes fails to identify the 
difference between these anomalies and it clusters them into a single anomaly. This 
happens due to the similar values for more than one selected feature. Table  5-4 presents 
the anomalies reported by Sqalli et al. [19]and Table  5-5 presents the DBSCAN 
Clustering results with the minimum and maximum values. 
Table ‎5-4 Scan-19 Anomalies detected by Sqalli et al. [19] 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent 
Dst IP 
Ent  
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
System 
Compromise 
1.807
8 
1.807
8 
2.15
9 
0.9893 
3.075
9 
4.11 5 
4.145
2 
1.518
5 
2.008
6 
Malicous File 
Download 
X X X X X X 
5.572
9 
5.572
9 
3.618
2 
3.618
5 
Port scan 1.5 12.26 1.53 12.26 0.218 0.419 
5.330
6 
5.330
6 
3.730
2 
2.064
4 
 
 
Table ‎5-5 Scan -19 DBSCAN Clustering with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2.13 2.92 0.3 0.3 
Cluster 2 0.37 0.98 0.98 1.2 0.99 0.99 3.71 3.77 1.11 1.11 
Cluster 3 0.96 1.91 0.92 1.97 0 0.22 2.51 4.4 0.78 2.44 
Cluster 4 12.59 12.97 12.58 12.96 0.08 0.33 5.83 5.86 3.91 4.02 
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Figure ‎5-4 Scan-19 3-D Clusters 
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  5.2.3  Scan 28 
 
Sqalli et al. [19] reported 4 malicious activities in the Day1 of the scan 28, while 
DBSCAN created five clusters. Figure  5-5 shows the graphical output of the clusters for 
this trace. Clusters 4 and 5 map exactly to the “Malicious File Download” and “System 
Compromise” activities, respectively. Cluster 1 is a large cluster representing two 
malicious activities, i.e., “IRC Communication” and “ICMP (DDoS)”. The reason of 
having two anomalies in the same cluster is discussed in section   5.2.2  . Clusters 2 and 3 
show traffic patterns which are not reported as malicious activities by Sqalli et al. [19]. 
The problem of having a cluster not representing any anomaly is discussed in section  
5.2.1  . Table  5-6 presents the anomalies reported by Sqalli et al. [19], and Table  5-7 
presents the DBSCAN Clustering with the minimum and maximum values. 
Table ‎5-6 Scan-28 Day-1 Anomalies detected by Sqalli et al. [19] 
 Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP 
Ent 
 Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packets 
 Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
System 
Compromise 
2.02 2.988 2.02 3.11 0 2.2 3.6577 5.87 1.342
4 
3.17 
Malicous File 
Download 
X X X X X X 5.5936 5.87 2.87 3.17 
IRC 
Communication 
1 2.5 1 2.6 0 2.5 3.7923 4.27
9 
1 1.986
7 
ICMP (DDoS) 0 1.38 0 1.63 0.721 3.4 3.8026 4.20
8 
0.778
1 
1.76 
Port Scan 7.09 8.8685 6.95 9.81 0 0.91 5.185 5.88
3 
2.608
5 
3.5 
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Table ‎5-7 Scan -28 Day-1 DBSCAN Clustering with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1 0 2.56 0 2.56 0.67 4.97 2.26 4.69 0.3 2.07 
Cluster 2 0.92 1 0.92 1 0 0 2.43 2.47 0.3 0.3 
Cluster 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.4 2.48 0.3 0.6 
Cluster 4 2.02 2.19 2.08 2.25 0.99 1.58 5.59 5.81 2.88 3.14 
Cluster 5 2.95 3.19 3.19 3.23 1.03 1.57 5.7 5.88 3.03 3.17 
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Figure ‎5-5 Scan-28 Day-1 3-D Clusters 
 
 
For the traffic from Day 3 of the scan 28, Sqalli et al. [19] reported 5 malicious 
activities. When we applied DBSCAN to the output, it created seven clusters. Figure  5-6 
shows the graphical output of the clusters for this trace. Cluster 1 represents two 
malicious activities, i.e., “System Compromise” and “ICMP (DDoS)” due to the 
overlapping threshold values, explained in section  5.2.2  . Clusters 4 and 7 represent 
“Malicious File Download” and “IRC Communication”, respectively. Clusters 2, 3, and 5 
represent a “Port Scan” event. The reason for having three separate clusters is that each 
one represents a different port scan attack with a different level of intensity. Most of the 
“Post Scan” attacks consist of very high values of Destination port entropy and 
Destination IP entropy. When we have multiple “Port Scan” attacks in a single dataset, it 
is uncommon for all of these attacks to have the same values for port entropy and 
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Destination entropy. And, if the difference between the entropy values of each attack is 
more than the Eps-radius, then they will be classified into separate clusters. Cluster 6 
represents an un-reported traffic pattern, due to the same explanation provided in section  
5.2.1  .  
Table  5-8 presents the anomalies reported by Sqalli et al. [19], and Table  5-9 presents 
the DBSCAN Clustering results with the minimum and maximum values. 
 
Table ‎5-8 Scan-28 Day-3 Anomalies detected by Sqalli et al. [19]] 
 Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst 
IP 
Ent 
 Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packets 
 Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
System 
Compromise 
2.02 2.988 2.02 3.11 0 2.2 3.657
7 
5.870
6 
1.342
4 
3.17 
Malicous File 
Download 
X X X X X X 5.593
6 
5.87 2.87 3.17 
IRC 
Communication 
0 0 0 0 0 0 3.219
3 
3.937
1 
1.176 1.875 
ICMP (DDoS) 0 1.38 0 1.63 0.721 3.4 3.802
6 
4.208
8 
0.778
1 
1.763
4 
Port Scan 4.99 7.424 5.29 9.61 0 0.39 4.748 5.228
4 
2.828
6 
3.442
9 
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Table ‎5-9 Scan -28 Day-3 DBSCAN Clustering with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1 0 2.18 0 2.25 0 3.15 3.15 4.66 0.78 2.36 
Cluster 2 7.31 8.48 9.61 9.87 0.96 1.57 3.88 4.15 1.18 1.69 
Cluster 3 7.96 8.45 9.69 9.87 0.03 1.19 5.19 5.88 3.19 3.49 
Cluster 4 1 2.45 1 2.45 0.04 0.68 5.21 5.87 3.14 3.5 
Cluster 5 7.04 7.45 8.86 9.68 0.02 0.34 4.07 4.55 1.38 2.12 
Cluster 6 0.78 0.98 0.78 0.98 0 0.49 4.57 4.77 2.33 2.87 
Cluster 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.24 4.2 1.18 2.02 
 
 
Figure ‎5-6 Scan-28 Day-3 3-D Clusters 
 
63 
5.3  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Once we have created the clusters, we calculated the maximum and minimum values 
for each cluster, and then we applied the known anomaly threshold values to these ranges 
to find the type of anomalous activity represented by that cluster. During these 
comparisons, we find four types of results.  
 The first case is when the cluster boundaries coincide with the anomaly 
threshold. 
 The second case is when a single cluster represents multiple anomalies, and 
this happens when anomaly thresholds are overlapping with each other in 
some or all traffic parameters. This happens mostly when the difference 
between two malicious activities is smaller than the Eps-radius, or when their 
threshold ranges overlap with each other. To overcome this problem, we need 
to look into the threshold values and come up with a common name for 
anomalies which have overlapping threshold values or we can add another 
feature which will help us to better differentiate these types of anomalies. 
 The third case is when multiple clusters represent a single anomaly, and this 
mostly happens due to the presence of multiple attacks of the same type but of 
different intensity. When we have multiple attacks of the same type in a single 
dataset, it is not necessary for all of these attacks to have the selected entropy 
and volume features. And, if the difference between the selected feature 
values of each attack is more than the Eps-radius, then they will be classified 
into separate clusters. 
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 The fourth case is when the cluster does not match any of the known threshold 
values for the anomalies, and this happens mostly due to the presence of non-
anomalous traffic in the dataset or the presence of a new type of attacks for 
which a threshold is not defined. Another reason is the presence of broadcast 
traffic and in some cases due to the switch level datasets. These datasets do 
not only contain the packets related to the honeypot traffic but they also have 
some packets which are not related to the honeypot.   
TABLE  5-10 presents the comparison between the reported malicious activities by 
Sqalli et al. [19]  and the clusters which are detected by the DBSCAN Clustering in our 
work. For Scan 14, DSBSCAN successfully detected all of the anomalies, which were 
reported by Sqalli et al. [19] as separate clusters. For Scan19, Sqalli et al. [19] reported 
four anomalies, while DBSCAN was able to detect three anomalies. DBSCAN detected 
one anomaly as a separate cluster and two anomalies as a part of a larger cluster. For 
Scan28 day1, Sqalli et al. [19] reported four anomalies, while DBSCAN was able to 
detect all four anomalies. DBSCAN detected two anomalies as separate clusters and two 
anomalies as part of larger cluster. For Scan 28 day3, Sqalli et al. [19] reported five 
anomalies, while DBSCAN was able to detect all five anomalies. DBSCAN detected two 
anomalies as a separate cluster, two as a part of larger cluster, and one anomaly is 
represented by three separate clusters. 
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Table ‎5-10 Results Comparison 
Trace Scan14 Scan19 Scan28 day 1 Scan28 day 3 
Reported Malicious Activities 
in [19] 
3 3 4 5 
Identified Clusters using 
DBSCAN 
5 4 5 7 
Clusters Matching Malicious 
Activities 
3 1+1a 2+1a 2+1a+3b 
Clusters not representing 
Malicious Activities 
2 2 2 1 
Xa = One Cluster Represents Multiple Events 
Xb = Multiple Clusters Represent a Single Event 
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CHAPTER 6                                                                                  
Hierarchical Clustering 
Agglomerative Clustering [31] is a Hierarchical Clustering algorithm which we are 
going to use for this thesis work. Details of Agglomerative Clustering have been 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. In this chapter we going to implement Agglomerative 
Clustering and then we will test the performance of Agglomerative Clustering on 
different network trace files. 
6.1  IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of the agglomerative clustering algorithm can be divided into 
three major activities. The first step is to create the distance matrix. The distance matrix 
for N data points is an NxN matrix consisting of N rows, where each row represents the 
distance of one data point to all the other data points. These distances can be calculated 
using various distance calculation algorithms, e.g., Euclidian distance, city-block 
distance, etc. 
The second step is to create the linkage matrix from the distance matrix. The linkage 
matrix uses a predefined linkage method, e.g., single-linkage, multiple linkage, average 
distance, or centroid. The task of the linkage matrix is to calculate the combination 
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similarity for each data point, and all future clustering operations will be based on this 
linkage matrix. Based on these combination similarities, a Hierarchical binary tree, called 
dendrogram is created. A dendrogram can be used to display the Hierarchical binary tree, 
displaying all the merge operations converging at the root of the binary tree. Figure  4-3 
and Figure  4-4 show the dendrogram created from the linkage matrix created for scan 14.  
The third and final step is to create clusters from the linkage matrix. For the cluster 
creation, we can use one of the three cutoff criteria for cluster creation, discussed in 
section  4.5.1  , i.e., by natural clustering, by specifying a certain threshold value of the 
combination similarity, or by specifying the number of clusters. To display the output of 
the clustering process, we can use a 3-D scatter plot. 
6.2  INITIAL EXPERIMENTS 
For the experimentation purpose, we are using the PCAP files from the “scan of the 
month” challenges provided by the global Honeynet community. Once we have 
completed the implementation, we decided to review different configurations of the 
agglomerative clustering, and find the combination which will help us to create more 
informative and well-defined clusters. The most important configuration in agglomerative 
clustering is the type of linkage used to create the clusters. We will experiment with both 
average linkage and centroid linkage. We have selected these two linkages because they 
use all the data points inside the cluster to calculate for the next merge operation. Then, at 
the end, we will compare the results. For the clustering criteria, we will use natural 
clustering. 
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  6.2.1  Average Linkage Clustering 
In the average linkage, when we need to take a decision about the merge operations, 
we look at all the distance pairs in both clusters and take their average. The average 
linkage has been discussed in details in section  4.5.2   
We used scan-14 and scan-28 for the initial testing with the average linkage 
clustering. 
   6.2.1.1 Scan-14 
The average linkage clustering produced five clusters from the scan-14 dataset, while 
using the natural clustering criteria. Figure  6-1 shows the 3-D plot of the clusters, and 
Table  6-1 shows the minimum and maximum values for each cluster. The clusters created 
by the average linkage clustering do not match with the already known malicious 
threshold. As discussed in section  4.5.2  , the average linkage clustering uses a weighted 
average to decide about the merge operations. When we applied the average linkage 
clustering to the scan-14 dataset, it produced five different clusters; but the clusters 
ranges do not match any of the threshold values for the known anomalies detected by 
Sqalli et al. [19].  
Our understanding about the average linkage clustering’s failure to create usable 
clusters is the use of a weighted average. When using a weighted average, each merge 
operation tends to favor the larger of the two clusters involved in the merging operation. 
In the end, clusters created by using average linkage do not match with known threshold 
values. 
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Table ‎6-1 Scan-14 Clusters with min-max values 
 
Dst Port 
Ent 
Src Port 
Ent 
Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1 0 1.418 0 1.246 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cluster 2 1.076 2.664 1.0762 3.002 0 1.476 3.3672 4.8522 1.1139 2.7443 
Cluster 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.3375 4.3375 2.4472 2.4472 
Cluster 4 0 1.240 0.8113 2.299 0 0 1.7924 2.7536 0 0.6021 
Cluster 5 2.426 3.640 3.0586 4.485 0 2.307 4.606 5.4738 2.0969 2.8176 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6-1 Scan-14 Hierarchical clustering with average linkage 
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   6.2.1.2 Scan-28 Day-3 
The average linkage clustering produced four clusters when applied to the scan-28 
day-3 dataset. The natural clustering is used here as the clustering criteria. Table  6-2 
shows the clusters with their minimum and maximum ranges. Figure  6-2 shows the 3-D 
scatter plot for the scan-28 day-3. Similar to the previous trace, the clusters created by the 
average linkage clustering for this trace do not match with the already known malicious 
activities ranges. The reason for not matching any known threshold value is discussed in 
section   6.2.1.1.  
 
Table ‎6-2 Scan 28 Day-3 Clusters with min-max values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 
1 
1.53 1.98 1.53 1.98 1.08 1.25 5.8 6.17 3.01 3.36 
Cluster 
2 
0 2.39 0 2.26 0 3.34 3.46 4.99 1.04 2.64 
Cluster 
3 
7.02 9.52 7.87 10.19 0.02 0.44 4.97 6.18 2.91 3.81 
Cluster 
4 
1.04 2.68 1.04 2.68 2.58 4.58 4.29 4.97 1.85 2.72 
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Figure ‎6-2 Scan-28 Day-3 Hierarchical clustering with average linkage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 
  6.2.2  Centroid Linkage Clustering 
In the centroid linkage, when we need to take a decision about the merge operation, 
we first calculate the centroid or center of mass, which is the average of all the data 
points inside the cluster. Then we calculate the minimum distance between centroids. All 
the decisions about the merge operations are based on the minimum distance between the 
centroids.  Centroid Linkage Clustering has been discussed in details in section  4.5.2   
We used scan-14 and scan-28 for the initial testing with the centroid linkage 
clustering. 
   6.2.2.1 Scan-14 
The centroid linkage clustering produced four clusters when applied to the scan-14 
dataset, while using the natural clustering as the clustering criterion. Table  6-3 shows the 
minimum and maximum values of the features in a clusters and it shows the type of 
anomaly which these clusters are representing. Figure  6-3 shows the 3-D scatter plot for 
scan-14. 
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Table ‎6-3 Scan-14 Clusters with min-max values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-RVC 1.08 2.66 1.08 3 0 1.48 3.37 4.85 1.11 2.74 
Cluster 2-MFD 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.34 4.34 2.45 2.45 
Cluster 3-noise 0 1.42 0 2.3 0 0 0 2.75 0 0.6 
Cluster 4-SC 2.43 3.64 3.06 4.49 0 2.31 4.61 5.47 2.1 2.82 
 
 
 
Figure ‎6-3 Scan-14 Centroid Linkage Clustering 
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   6.2.2.2 Scan-28 Day-3 
The centroid linkage clustering produced eight clusters when applied to the scan-28 day-3 dataset, while 
using the natural clustering as the clustering criterion.  
Table  6-4 shows the minimum and maximum values of the clusters as well as the type 
of anomaly represented by these clusters. Figure  6-4 shows the 3-D scatter plot for scan-
28 Day-3. 
 
Table ‎6-4 Scan-28 Day-3 Clusters with min-max values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-IRC 0 0 0 0 2.22 3.03 4.09 4.49 1.32 1.87 
Cluster 2-s-PS 9.42 9.52 9.54 9.58 0.06 0.08 6.17 6.18 3.47 3.49 
Cluster 3-s-PS 7.02 7.98 7.87 8.93 0.34 0.44 4.97 5.71 2.91 3.13 
Cluster 4-SC 0.41 2.68 0.65 2.68 0.49 3.82 3.46 4.99 1.23 2.72 
Cluster 5-s-MFD 1.53 1.98 1.53 1.98 1.08 1.25 5.8 6.17 3.01 3.36 
Cluster 6-s-SC 1.04 1.68 1.04 1.68 3.9 4.58 4.33 4.42 1.9 2.18 
Cluster 7-ICMP 0 0.92 0 0.57 0 1.99 3.46 4.54 1.04 2.44 
Cluster 8-PS 7.26 8.82 9.42 10.19 0.02 0.18 5.2 5.99 3.34 3.81 
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Figure ‎6-4 Scan-28 Day-3 Centroid Linkage Clustering 
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6.3  RESULTS DISCUSSION 
In this chapter, we experimented with a hierarchical Clustering algorithm with two 
different linkages, average linkage and centroid linkage. In the average linkage, we were 
able to create different clusters but these clusters did not match any of the detected 
threshold values for the known anomalies. On the other hand, the centroid linkage 
clustering was able to identify all of the anomalies, available in the dataset, by creating 
the clusters that match the detected threshold values for the known anomalies. Based on 
the results obtained here, we decided to use the centroid linkage for the experiments 
related to the hierarchical clustering in this thesis work. In summary, the hierarchical 
clustering with centroid linkage worked very well in identifying the general attack 
categories. But in some cases, especially for the system compromise attack, it failed to do 
so; while Sqalli et al. [19]have divided the thresholds into specific attack categories. For 
these attacks, which fall under the sub-category of system compromise attack, 
Hierarchical clustering sometimes categorized the anomalies into their generalized attack 
category, i.e., system compromise, rather than creating separate clusters for each 
specialized attack.  
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CHAPTER 7                                              
Performance Analysis 
In this chapter, we will apply both clustering algorithms, DBSCAN and Hierarchical 
Clustering, to different datasets. Some of these datasets are provided by the Honeynet 
community and some are generated inside a KFUPM lab. Once we have the results, by 
applying both schemes to the same datasets, then we will compare the efficiency of both 
algorithms as well as the detection rate. This will also help to determine which algorithm 
is better to be used for the automatic detection of the anomalies from new datasets.  
7.1  EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
For the experimental setup, we are using a JAVA code to determine the entropy 
values for the selected features from the provided PCAP files. JNetPcap Java API is used 
to read the PCAP files. Once we have the entropy values, then we will provide these 
entropy values as an input to both algorithms to create the clusters. Both algorithms will 
provide the output in the form of 3-D scatter plots and cluster tables, comprising the 
minimum and maximum values for each cluster against each of the selected features.  
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The trace files used for obtaining the results are: 
 Scan 27: Scan of the month challenge provided by honeynet.org, March 2003 
 Dionaea Capture Trace-1 and 2: This is provided by the Saudi Honeynet 
Project team, collected from the KFUPM network. 
 Lab Trace: Trace created inside a lab environment by using the penetration 
testing tool provided in backtrack 4.1 [21]. 
 
7.2  DESCRIPTION OF TRACES USED 
  7.2.1  Scan 27 
This trace was collected from Honeynet.org which releases the Scan of the Month 
Challenges. This trace was collected by the Azusa Pacific University Honeynet Project 
team from an un-patched Windows 2000 honeypot. The details of this trace are provided 
in Table  7-1. 
Table ‎7-1 Scan-27 Dataset Details 
Source Honeynet.org, Scan of the Month Challenge 
File Name Scan27.pcap 
Format PCAP File 
Size 17.6 MB 
Number of Packets 54536 
Duration 5 Days 
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The identification of anomalies inside this dataset was also provided by the 
Honeynet.org as the solution for this challenge. We will compare our results against the 
solutions provided by the Honeynet.org. 
  7.2.2  Dionaea Capture Trace 
A low interaction honeypot Dionaea was setup and connected in the KFUPM 
network. The two trace files were collected by the Saudi Honeynet Project team as part of 
their network monitoring project. The trace details are given in Table  7-2. 
Table ‎7-2 Dionaea Dataset Details 
Source Saudi HoneynetProject team 
Number of files 2 
File Name Dionaea-trace1.pcap 
File Name Dioanea-trace2.pcap 
Format PCAP File 
Size 15.6 MB, 648KB 
Number of Packets 1541731 
Duration  1 Day 
 
The result of this dataset is provided by the Saudi Honeynet Project team. We will use 
these results to compare them to the clusters created by both algorithms used in our work.  
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  7.2.3  Lab Trace 
The last trace that we have used was generated in the Lab setup within KFUPM. A 
Honeynet was setup with Honeywall - a high interaction honeypot and Windows XP 
honeypot. The BackTrack 4.1 operating system was used to launch different types of 
attacks targeting the Windows XP honeypot. The honeypot was made visible on the 
network and popular services were activated on it such as IIS web server, FTP server, 
SSH server, etc. The main tools that were used from the BackTrack operating system are 
Nmap, Open VAS vulnerability scanner, and Metasploit Penetration Testing Framework 
3.0. 
The Metasploit Framework [30] is one of the most popular Open Source penetration 
testing tools that are available in the market [34]. We used these tools to generate a trace 
that includes different types of malicious activities. The Metasploit framework has been 
used by other authors to generate similar datasets for the purpose of evaluating their 
anomaly detection techniques. Laskov and Kloft [35] have used the Metasploit 
framework to create a malicious dataset by generating various exploits. Rieck and Laskov 
[36] have also used the Metasploit framework to create a malicious dataset for the 
purpose of testing their anomaly detection technique. Düssel et al. [37] also used the 
Metasploit framework to generate malicious dataset for testing their anomaly detection 
technique. 
Details of the trace file used are given in the Table  7-3. 
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Table ‎7-3 Lab Trace Dataset Details 
Source Network Security Lab 
File Name Labcptr.pcap 
Format PCAP File 
Size 30 MB 
Number of Packets 312599 
Duration  22 Day 
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The details of the attacks conducted are presented in Table  7-4. 
Table ‎7-4 Lab Trace Attacks Detail 
Categories Type of attack 
Port Scan 
NMAP regular scan 
NMAP quick scan 
NMAP intense scan 
NMAP slow comprehensive scan 
Vulnerability Scanning Open VAS Scanner 
Database attacks 
MYSQL login utility scanner 
MYSQL database access attempts 
Server Message Block (SMB) 
protocol attacks 
SMB Negotiate Dialect Corruption 
(Fuzzers/smb/smb_negotiate_corrupt) 
Microsoft Workstation Service 
NetAddAlternateComputerName Overflow 
Microsoft Server Service Relative Path 
Stack Corruption 
Microsoft Server Service 
NetpwPathCanonicalize Overflow 
Microsoft Plug and Play Service Overflow 
Microsoft Print Spooler Service 
Impersonation Vulnerability 
DCE/RPC, (Distributed Computing 
Environment / Remote Procedure 
Calls) attacks 
Endpoint Mapper Service Discovery 
(scanner/dcerpc/endpoint_mapper) 
DCERPC TCP Service Auditor 
Microsoft RPC DCOM Interface Overflow 
exploit 
Microsoft Message Queuing Service Path 
Overflow exploit 
83 
FTP 
Simple FTP Fuzzer 
FTP attack access gain attempt 
HTTP IIS web server attacks 
Microsoft IIS WebDAV Writ exploit 
Microsoft IIS 5.0 Printer exploit 
Microsoft IIS/PWS CGI Fil exploit 
Microsoft IIS 5.0 WebDAV ntdll.dll Path 
Overflow 
SMTP attacks 
MS03-046 Exchange 2000 XEXCH50 Heap 
Overflow exploit 
SNMP attacks 
Network Node Manager Snmp.exe CGI 
Buffer Overflow 
Backdoor Energizer DUO Trojan Code Execution 
SSH attacks SSH Key Exchange Init Corruption 
 
7.3  COLLECTED RESULTS 
We applied the two clustering algorithms, Hierarchical clustering and DBSCAN 
clustering, to the datasets discussed in the previous section. The process of gathering 
results is similar to the process discussed in chapters 4 and 5 for DBSCAN Clustering 
and Hierarchical Clustering, respectively. Initially, we calculated the entropy value for 
the three IP header based traffic features, i.e., Destination port entropy, Source port 
entropy, and Destination IP entropy. And, for the two volume based features, i.e., total 
payload bytes and total packet count, we took the log10 of the original values for 
normalization. The values of the entropy based features were in the range of one to 
fifteen, while the values of the volume based features were in the ranges of five hundred 
to ten thousand. Therefore, we have normalized the volume values by taking log10 of the 
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original values. Once we have all the values of these five traffic features stored in a 
comma separated file, we use them as an input to the clustering algorithms.  
The results collected from each clustering algorithm are provided in this chapter.  The 
results will be presented in the following order. First, we will present the results for each 
dataset separately; and then at the end, we will discuss all the collected results and 
compare the performance of both clustering algorithms, i.e., DBSCAN and Hierarchical 
Clustering. For each dataset, initially we will provide all the reported results from the 
literature, and then we will present our results for that dataset using both Hierarchical and 
DBSCAN Clustering. Finally, we will compare our collected results with the reported 
results for that dataset.  
  7.3.1  Scan 27 
Scan of the month challenge 27 was presented by the honeynet.org as a challenge of 
the month. Table  7-5 shows the reported anomalies for the scan 27. 
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Table ‎7-5 Reported Anomalies for Scan-27 
Type of Anomaly No. of  Occurrences 
SMB Attacks 5 
System Compromise 1 
Malicious File Download 1 
HTML Script Kiddies 1 
Buffer Overflow 1 
Port Scan 3 
Vulnerability Scan 1 
Slammer Worm 1 
IRC Communication 1 
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   7.3.1.1 Hierarchical Clustering 
Hierarchical clustering produced nine clusters when applied to the scan 27 datasets. 
Out of these nine clusters, clusters 1, 4, and 6 are all port scan attacks. Cluster 9 matches 
the threshold of the vulnerability scan. Cluster 7 matches the threshold of the IRC 
communication from the affected machine to the botnet server. Clusters 2 and 8 match 
the threshold values for the system compromise attack. Cluster 3 matches the malicious 
file download’s threshold signatures. On the other hand, cluster 5 presents the noise 
inside the input dataset, which is mostly due to the fact that these scan files also have 
some network traffic which is not coming from or going to the Honeypot IP address.  
Scan 27 is a switch level trace file, so it also includes traffic coming to other hosts 
connected to the same switch. Figure  7-1 shows the 3-D plot for the clusters created by 
the Hierarchical clustering algorithm. Table  7-6  shows the cluster ranges for each type of 
anomaly.  
 
Figure ‎7-1 3-D Hierarchical Clustering of scan 27 
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Table ‎7-6 Hierarchical Clustering of scan 27 with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-PS 7.33 7.33 2.74 2.74 0.02 0.02 5.25 5.25 3.44 3.44 
Cluster 2-SC 0 2.38 0.88 2.48 0 1.9 2.18 3.82 0.3 1.58 
Cluster 3-MFD 1.64 1.64 1.41 1.41 1.06 1.06 7.06 7.06 4.23 4.23 
Cluster 4-PS 7.09 7.09 7.11 7.11 0.64 0.64 4.33 4.33 2.49 2.49 
Cluster 5-noise 0 1.21 0 1.21 0 0.21 0 0 0 0 
Cluster 6-PS 8.37 8.37 0.17 0.17 0 0 5.08 5.08 3.3 3.3 
Cluster 7-IRC 0 2.27 0 2.42 0 0.55 4.2 6.2 2.18 3.4 
Cluster 8-SC 3.04 3.12 2.61 3.41 0.23 2.12 5.51 5.71 2.83 3.07 
Cluster 9-VS 4.78 6.02 4.54 5.93 0 0 4.95 5.39 3.1 3.58 
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   7.3.1.2 DBSCAN 
When we applied DBSCAN clustering to the Scan 27, it produced eight clusters. 
Clusters 2 and 4 match the threshold of the IRC Communication from a compromised 
machine to the botnet server. Clusters 5 and 6 match the threshold for the System 
compromise attack. Cluster 7 matches the malicious file down attack’s threshold. Cluster 
1 matches the HTML script kiddies attack and cluster 3 matches the slammer worm 
attack. Cluster 8 matches the threshold of the vulnerability scan attack. Figure  7-2 shows 
the 3-D plot of the DBSCAN clustering for the Scan 27. 
 
 
Figure ‎7-2 3-D DBSCAN clustering of scan 27 
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Table  7-7 represents the clusters created by the DBSCAN clustering along with the 
minimum and maximum values for each cluster. 
Table ‎7-7 DBSCAN Clustering of Scan 27 with Min-Max values 
 
Dst Port 
Ent 
Src Port 
Ent 
Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min 
Ma
x 
Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-Html 
Script 
0.76 2.15 0.76 2.15 0 0.54 2.33 3.82 0.3 1.58 
Cluster 2-IRC 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.18 3.08 0.3 1.11 
Cluster 3-Slammer 1.53 1.64 0.92 1.53 
0.9
7 
1.06 3.02 3.14 0.6 1 
Cluster 4-IRC 0 0 1 1 0 0 2.92 3.26 0.3 1.04 
Cluster 5-SC 0 2.17 0 2.52 0 0.99 4.2 5.44 2.18 3.58 
Cluster 6-SC 1.91 2.37 2.31 2.36 1 1.38 2.68 2.92 0.3 0.48 
Cluster 7-MFD 0 0 1 1 0 0 5.08 5.51 2.83 3.3 
Cluster 8-VS 4.78 4.98 5.82 5.93 0 0 3.02 3.14 1 1 
 
Table  7-8 presents the results comparison of both clustering algorithms against the 
reported results as well as the detection results of sqalli et al. [19]. The Hierarchical 
Clustering algorithm was successful in detecting 82% of the anomalies except for the 
Buffer Overflow attack, the Slammer worm attack, and the HTML script kiddies attack. 
Hierarchical clustering also performed very well in detecting the port scan attack, 
according to their intensity and categorized them in separate clusters. DBSCAN does not 
perform very well on this dataset as it only detected 71% of the anomalies. DBSCAN was 
unable to detect any of the port scan attacks or buffer overflow attacks. But, it was 
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successful in detecting the Slammer worm attack and the HTML script kiddies’ attack, 
which had gone undetected in Hierarchical clustering. Both Clustering algorithms are 
able to detect the system compromise attack and also the SMB attack on Microsoft 
services running on port 445. Both Clustering algorithms were also successful in 
detecting malicious file download and IRC Communication attacks.  
 
Table ‎7-8 Result Comparison for scan 27 
Type of Anomaly 
No. of  
Occurrences 
Hierarchical 
Clustering 
DBSCAN 
Sqalli et 
al[19] 
SMB Attacks 5 Yes, one cluster Yes, one cluster Yes 
System Compromise 1 Yes, one cluster Yes, one cluster Yes 
Slammer Worm 1 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Yes, one cluster Not detected 
HTML Script 
Kiddies 
1 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Yes, one cluster Yes 
Buffer Overflow 1 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Yes 
Malicious File 
Download 
1 Yes, one cluster Yes, one cluster Yes 
Port Scan 3 Yes, Three cluster Not Detected 
Yes, 1 
occurrence 
Vulnerability Scan 1 Yes, one cluster Yes, one cluster Not detected 
IRC Communication 2 Yes, one cluster Yes, two cluster Yes 
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  7.3.2  Dionaea Capture Trace-1 
The Dionaea Capture Trace-1 was captured by the Saudi Honeynet Project team as 
part of their Honeypot deployment inside KFUPM network. The anomalies for this trace 
that have been reported by the Saudi Honeynet Project team in Sqalli et al. [19]are 
presented in Table  7-9. 
Table ‎7-9 Reported Anomalies in Dionaea Capture Trace-1 
Type of Anomaly No. of  Occurrences 
Web Robots 2 
System Compromise, 
SQL Brute Force 
2 
Connection attempts 
on popular ports 
4 
SIP Worm 1 
Port Scan 3 
 
   7.3.2.1 Hierarchical Clustering  
When we applied Hierarchical clustering to the Dionaea Capture Trace-1, we 
obtained eight clusters as output. Cluster 4 represents the port scan attack. Clusters 5 and 
6 represent the system compromise attack on the SQL by brute forcing or password 
guessing. Clusters 7 and 8 match the threshold of the attack on the popular ports by 
having multiple connection attempts. Cluster 1 matches the threshold of the web robots 
attack on the honeypot and cluster 2 represents the SIP worm attack, which tries to 
connect of the SIP port 5060. Cluster 3 represents the noise in the available dataset. This 
noise is mostly due to the fact that all the packets available in the dataset are not coming 
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from or going towards the Honeypot. Figure  7-3 shows the 3-D plot of the Hierarchical 
clustering on the Dioanea Capture Trace-1.  
 
 
Figure ‎7-3 3-D plot of the Hierarchical Clustering of Dionaea Capture Trace-1 
Table  7-10 represents the cluster created by the Hierarchical clustering along with the 
minimum and maximum values for each cluster. 
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Table ‎7-10 Hierarchical Clustering of Dioanaea Capture trace-1 with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port 
Ent 
Src Port 
Ent 
Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-Web Robots 6.37 7.25 8.68 9.66 0 0.57 5.72 6 3.74 4.02 
Cluster 2-SIP 0.86 2.32 0.92 2.59 0 1 2.09 4.12 0.3 1.79 
Cluster 3-noise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cluster 4-PS 
10.3
3 
11.4
4 
7.56 
10.5
4 
0.17 0.59 5.3 6.23 3.49 4.42 
Cluster 5-SC SQL BF 6.65 6.65 3.98 3.98 0.01 0.01 5.71 5.71 3.82 3.82 
Cluster 6-SC- SQL BF 5.64 7.07 6.52 7.96 0 1.56 5.18 5.66 3.18 3.6 
Cluster 7-Conection 
attempts 
1.88 4.39 2.2 4.48 0 1.14 2.99 4.21 1.23 2.36 
Cluster 8-Connection 
Attempts 
3.65 3.92 5.16 6.28 2.09 2.56 4.67 5.35 2.62 3.15 
 
   7.3.2.2 DBSCAN 
When we applied DBSCAN clustering to the Dionaea Capture Trace-1, it produced 
six clusters. Clusters 1 and 4 represent the System Compromise attack on the MS-SQL 
service by brute forcing or password guessing. Cluster 2 matches the threshold of the 
attack on the popular services by having various connection attempts. Clusters 3 and 5 
represent the port scan attack on the Honeypot IP address, while cluster 6 matches the 
threshold of the web robots attack on the Honeypot. Web robots are mostly automated 
scripts which crawl over the Internet, looking for vulnerable web servers. Figure  7-4 
represents the 3-D plot of the DBSCAN clustering for the Dionaea Capture Trace-1. 
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Figure ‎7-4 3-D plot of DBSCAN clustering of Dionaea Capture Trace-1 
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Table  7-11 shows the DBSCAN Clustering of the Dionaea Capture Trace-1 with the 
minimum and maximum values of each cluster.  
 
Table ‎7-11 DBSCAN Clustering of Dionaea Capture Trace -1 with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port 
Ent 
Src Port 
Ent 
Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total 
Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-SC-SQL BF 6.65 6.93 3.98 4.55 0.01 0.01 5.71 5.93 3.82 4.04 
Cluster 2- Connection 
attempts 
0.86 4.26 0.92 4.48 0 1.14 2.09 4.21 0.3 2.36 
Cluster 3-PS 10.5 11.0 7.56 7.76 0.21 0.42 5.38 5.47 3.6 3.67 
Cluster 4--SC-SQL BF 6.52 7.07 6.52 7.07 0 0.2 5.18 5.3 3.18 3.3 
Cluster 5-PS 11.2 11.4 9.05 9.21 0.17 0.35 5.84 6.23 4.05 4.42 
Cluster 6- Web robots 7.01 7.25 9.36 9.66 0 0.57 5.96 6 3.97 4.02 
 
Table  7-12 represents the results comparison of both clustering algorithms against the 
reported results as well as the detection results of sqalli et al. [19]. The Hierarchical 
Clustering algorithm was successful in detecting all of the anomalies. The Hierarchical 
clustering performed very well in detecting the port scan attack, and SQL brute force 
attacks. Hierarchical clustering was also able to detect the SIP worm attack. DBSCAN 
also perform very well on this dataset as it was able to detect 92% of the attacks. It was 
also successful in detecting port scan attacks and placing them in a separate cluster 
according to their intensity. However, DBSCAN was unable to detect the SIP worm 
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attack. Both Clustering algorithms are able to detect the system compromise attack, 
which was an SQL brute force in this case. Both Clustering algorithms were also 
successful in detecting the Web robots attack and the multiple connection request attack. 
Table ‎7-12 Comparison of the reported results with Clustering result 
Type of Anomaly 
No. of  
Occurrences 
Hierarchical 
Clustering 
DBSCAN 
Sqalli et all, 
[19] 
Web Robots 2 Yes, 1 Cluster Yes, 1 Cluster Yes 
System Compromise, SQL 
Brute Force 
2 Yes, 2 Clusters Yes, 2 Clusters Yes 
Connection attempts on 
popular ports 
4 Yes, 2 Clusters Yes, 1 Cluster Yes 
SIP Worm 1 Yes, 1 Cluster 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Not detected 
Port Scan 3 Yes, 1 Cluster Yes, 2 Cluster Yes 
 
  7.3.3  Dionaea Capture Trace-2 
Dionaea Capture Trace-2 was captured by the Saudi Honeynet Project team as part of 
their Honeypot deployment inside the KFUPM network. The following anomalies have 
been reported for this trace by the Saudi Honeynet Project team in Sqalli et al. [19], and 
are presented in Table  7-13. 
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Table ‎7-13 Reported results for the Dionaea Capture Trace-2 
Type of Anomaly No. of  Occurrences 
Vulnerability Scanning 1 
phpmyadmin Attacks 1 
Connection attempts on 
popular ports 
1 
SIP Worm 1 
 
   7.3.3.1 Hierarchical Clustering 
When we applied Hierarchical clustering to the Dionaea Capture Trace-2 trace, we 
get five clusters as output. Cluster 4 matches the threshold values for the vulnerability 
scan. Cluster 2 matches the description of the attack targeted towards PhpMyAdmin. 
Cluster 5 matches the threshold of the attack on the popular port by having multiple 
connections; and in this dataset, the popular port used was the FTP port. Cluster 1 
matches the description of the SIP worm, and cluster 3 is labeled as noise. Noise in the 
datasets is due to the broadcast traffic and also to the traffic which is not intended for the 
Honeypot IP address. Figure  7-5  shows the 3-D plot of the Hierarchical Clustering of the 
Dionaea Capture Trace-2.  
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Figure ‎7-5 3-D plot of the Hierarchical Clustering of Dionaea Capture Trace-2 
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Table  7-14  shows the Hierarchical Clustering of the Dionaea Capture Trace-2 with 
the minimum and maximum values of each cluster. 
Table ‎7-14 Hierarchical Clustering of Dionaea Capture trace-2 with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-SIP 0.81 2.32 0.92 2.25 0 1.09 2.06 3.91 0.3 2.06 
Cluster 2-PHP MA 0.92 2.41 0.92 2.41 0 2.53 4.39 5.93 2.32 4.12 
Cluster 3-noise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cluster 4-VS 0.92 0.92 9.22 9.22 0 0 2.09 2.09 0.3 0.3 
Cluster 5-FTP con 3.03 3.72 3.4 3.72 0 0.38 2.26 3.69 0.48 1.85 
 
   7.3.3.2 DBSCAN 
When we applied DBSCAN Clustering to the Dionaea Capture Trace-2, it produced 
five clusters. Clusters 1, 2, and 3 match the threshold of the attack on the PhpMyAdmin. 
Cluster 4 represents the SIP attack worm and Cluster 5 represents the attack on the FTP 
port. Figure  7-6  shows the 3-D clustering created by the DBSCAN from the Dionaea 
Capture Trace-2. 
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Figure ‎7-6 3-D plot of DBSCAN clustering of Dionaea Capture Trace-2 
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Table  7-15  shows the DBSCAN Clustering of the Dionaea Capture Trace-2 with the 
minimum and maximum values of each cluster. 
Table ‎7-15 DBSCAN Clustering of Dionaea Capture Trace -2 with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent 
Total Payload 
Bytes 
Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-PHP 
MA 
1 2.41 0.92 2.41 0 0.48 4.88 5.93 2.88 4.12 
Cluster 2- PHP 
MA 
0.92 2.32 1 2 0 0 2.08 3.28 0.3 1.34 
Cluster 3- PHP 
MA 
0.92 2.25 0.92 2.25 0 1.09 3.12 3.85 1.08 1.65 
Cluster 4-SIP 1.52 1.59 1.52 1.59 0.81 1 2.06 2.41 0.3 0.6 
Cluster 5-FTP 
Con 
0.81 0.95 0.92 1.41 0 0.56 3.85 3.91 1.89 2.06 
 
Table  7-16  represents the comparison of the reported results with the results obtained 
by both clustering algorithms, as well as the comparison with the results reported by 
Sqalli et al. [19]. Hierarchical clustering was able to identify all the anomalies present in 
the Dionaea Capture Trace-2 dataset, including Vulnerability scanning, PhpMyAdmin 
attack, FTP attack, and the SIP worm attack. Similar to the Hierarchical clustering, 
DBSCAN Clustering was able to identify all the anomalies in the dataset. DBSCAN 
reported PhpMyAdmin attacks under 3 different clusters, while in the reported results it 
has only one occurrence. The reason of having multiple clusters in this case is that the 
dataset we used for this experiment has very few packets, and all the data points are very 
sparse. Also, the single occurrence of a PhpMyAdmin attack has similar IP and Port 
Entropy values, but the values of the total payload bytes and packet count vary during the 
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whole attack. This is due to the fact that a PhpMyAdmin attack starts with a very small 
number of packets, in which the attacker uses a specially crafted URL to gain access to 
the system. After that, the attacker tries to download a rootkit to the compromised 
PhpMyAdmin server, and this involves a high number of packets and payload bytes. 
Finally, the attacker uses the rootkit to run various commands on the compromised 
PhpMyAdmin server, and this involves a medium number of packets and payload bytes. 
So, all these three clusters lie in the same threshold area, but with little differences. 
Because of this, DBSCAN has labeled all the three clusters as a single anomaly category, 
i.e., the PhpMyAdmin attack. DBSCAN was also unable to identify the Vulnerability 
scan attack on the Honeypot IP. The 3-D graph of the original dataset shows the existence 
of the data points in the threshold region for the vulnerability scan, but DBSCAN was 
unable to identify the anomaly because the number of points is less than the number 
required to create a DBSCAN cluster within the neighborhood radius. For this reason, 
DBSCAN was not able to identify the Vulnerability scan. Table  7-16 presents the 
comparison of the reported results with the results obtained by the clustering algorithms.  
Table ‎7-16 Comparison of the reported results with Clustering result 
Type of Anomaly 
No. of  
Occurrences 
Hierarchical 
Clustering 
DBSCAN 
Sqalli et all, 
[19] 
Vulnerability Scanning 1 Yes, 1 Cluster 
Not 
detected 
Yes 
phpmyadmin Attacks 1 Yes, 1 Cluster 
Yes, 3 
Cluster 
Yes 
Connection attempts on 
popular ports 
1 Yes, 1 Cluster 
Yes, 1 
Cluster 
Yes 
SIP Worm 1 Yes, 1 Cluster 
Yes, 1 
Cluster 
Not detected 
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  7.3.4  Lab Capture 
This trace was created inside the lab environment. The purpose of this is to create 
synthetic anomalies trace, and then apply the anomaly detection technique to check 
whether it will detect these anomalies. We also used the same lab capture trace to 
evaluate the performance of the clustering algorithms. Table  7-17  shows the reported 
results for the Lab capture trace.  
Table ‎7-17 Reported results for the Lab Capture trace. 
Type of Anomaly No. of  Occurrences 
System Compromise, 
ICMP Flood 
3 
System Compromise 12 
Brute Force password 
guessing 
4 
SMB Attack 2 
Port Scan- NMAP 5 
Vulnerability Scan 1 
SSH Attack 1 
 
   7.3.4.1 Hierarchical Clustering  
When we applied the Hierarchical clustering to the Lab capture trace, it produced 
seven clusters. Cluster 6 matches the threshold of the port scan attack. Cluster 2 
represents the Vulnerability scan attack on the honeypot. Cluster 5 represents the ICMP 
Flood attack. Cluster 4 represents the system compromise attack on the SMB service. 
Cluster 7 matches the threshold for the system compromise attack. And, cluster 1 
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matches the threshold of the brute force password guessing attack, while cluster 3 
represents the noise present in the dataset. The noise in the dataset is mostly due to the 
packets, which are not directed to or from the Honeypot IP, and this happens mostly in 
the switch level datasets. Figure  7-7  represents the 3-D plot of the Hierarchical clustering 
produced for the lab capture trace.  
 
Figure ‎7-7 3-D plot of the Hierarchical Clustering for the Lab Capture Trace 
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Table  7-18  shows the Hierarchical Clustering of the Lab Capture trace with the 
minimum and maximum values of each cluster. 
Table ‎7-18  Hierarchical Clustering of Lab Capture trace with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-BF 2.99 4.75 4.06 5.38 0 0.08 5 5.96 3 3.33 
Cluster 2-VS 11.45 12.32 11.46 12.33 0 0.02 5.86 5.99 4.07 4.2 
Cluster 3-noise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cluster 4-SMB 1.89 4.09 3.99 4.14 3.06 4.42 3.89 4.47 2.05 2.13 
Cluster 5-ICMP 4.05 8.07 6.13 8.12 0 0.23 4.86 6.21 3.07 4.33 
Cluster 6-PS 9.62 11.03 7.23 9.64 0 0.07 5.1 5.96 3.31 4.16 
Cluster 7-SC 0 3.92 0 3.92 0 3.37 2.39 5.67 0 3.3 
 
   7.3.4.2 DBSCAN  
DBSCAN Clustering of the lab capture trace produced ten clusters. Clusters 1, 7, and 
8 match the threshold of the System Compromise attack. Clusters 3, 4, and 5 represent 
the system compromise attack by ICMP Flooding. Cluster 9 matches the threshold of the 
System Compromise attack on the SMB service. Cluster 6 represents the brute force 
password guessing attack. Cluster 2 represents the port scan attack. Cluster 10 represents 
the noise in the dataset. Figure  7-8 shows the 3-D plot of the DBSCAN clustering for the 
lab capture trace.  
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Figure ‎7-8 3-D plot of DBSCAN clustering of Lab Capture Trace 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
Table  7-19  shows the DBSCAN Clustering of the lab capture trace with the 
minimum and maximum values of each cluster. 
Table ‎7-19 DBSCAN Clustering of Lab Capture Trace with Min-Max Values 
 
Dst Port Ent Src Port Ent Dst IP Ent Total Payload Bytes Total Packets 
 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Cluster 1-SC 0 3.92 0 3.92 0 1.94 2.39 4.88 0.6 2.85 
Cluster 2-PS 11.45 11.57 11.46 11.58 0 0.01 5.86 5.99 4.07 4.2 
Cluster 3 ICMP 8.02 8.07 8.05 8.09 0.11 0.23 4.86 4.88 3.07 3.09 
Cluster 4- ICMP 6.83 7.12 6.83 7.12 0 0 5.4 5.46 3.49 3.55 
Cluster 5-ICMP 6.09 6.44 6.13 6.49 0 0 6.09 6.21 4.24 4.33 
Cluster 6-BF 4.33 4.75 4.06 5.38 0 0.08 5 5.53 3 3.33 
Cluster 7-SC 1.25 1.69 1.26 1.72 0 0 5.42 5.67 3.06 3.3 
Cluster 8-SC 1.86 2.17 2.19 2.59 0 0.49 5.18 5.47 2.38 2.51 
Cluster 9-SMB 3.18 3.28 3.18 3.31 0.35 0.35 5.16 5.2 2.54 2.54 
Cluster 10-Noise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table  7-20 represents the comparison of the reported results with the results produced 
by the clustering process, and it also includes the comparison with the results reported by 
sqalli et al. [19]. Hierarchical clustering was able to identify all the attacks and put them 
in separate clusters. Only two attacks, SSH attack and path overflow exploit, are not 
detected by the Hierarchical clustering algorithm. Other than these two attacks, all other 
attacks were detected.  DBSCAN also performed very well on this trace as it was able to 
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identify 93% of anomalies. For ICMP flood attack and System comprise attack, 
DBSCAN created three separate clusters for each attack. The reason for creating three 
separate clusters is the difference in the intensity of the attack, but all three clusters lay 
inside the defined threshold for the attack, so all the attacks are labeled under the same 
anomaly type.  
Table ‎7-20 Comparison of the reported results with Clustering result 
Type of Anomaly 
No. of  
Occurrences 
Hierarchical 
Clustering 
DBSCAN 
Sqalli et all, 
[19] 
System Compromise, 
ICMP Flood 
3 Yes, 1 cluster Yes, 3 Clusters Yes 
System Compromise 12 Yes, 1 cluster Yes, 3 Clusters Yes 
Brute Force password 
guessing 
4 Yes, 1 cluster Yes, 1 Cluster Yes 
SMB Attack 24 Yes, 1 cluster Yes, 1 Cluster Yes 
Port Scan- NMAP 5 Yes, 1 cluster Yes, 1 Cluster Yes 
Vulnerability Scan 1 Yes, 1 cluster Not Detected Yes 
SSH Attack 1 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
No 
Path Overflow exploit 1 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
Merged in other 
Cluster 
No 
 
7.4  RESULTS OVERVIEW 
Table 7-21 shows the performance overview of both clustering algorithms, 
Hierarchical Clustering and DBSCAN, against all the network trace files used for the 
experimentation. It also compares our results with the results reported by Sqalli et al. 
[19]. In Table 7-21, the first column represents the trace files used, the second column 
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represents the number of anomalies detected by Sqalli et al. [19], while the third and 
fourth columns represent the number of anomalies detected by Hierarchical clustering 
and DBSCAN, respectively, along with their percentage of success in comparison with 
the results reported by Sqalli et al. [19]. 
Table ‎7-21 Performance of clustering algorithms against each Trace file 
Trace Name Sqalli et al. [19] Hierarchical Clustering DBSCAN 
Scan 27 17 14 (82%) 12 (71%) 
Dionaea Capture trace-1 12 12 (100%) 11 (92%) 
Dionaea Capture trace-2 5 5 (100%) 4 (80%) 
Lab Capture 15 15 (100%) 14 (93%) 
 
Table 7-22 shows the performance overview of both clustering algorithms, 
Hierarchical Clustering and DBSCAN, against different anomaly types present in the 
network trace files used for the experimentation. It also compares our results with the 
results reported by Sqalli et al. [19]. 
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Table ‎7-22 Performance of clustering algorithms against each Anomaly Type 
Anomaly Type Sqalli et al. [19] 
Hierarchical 
Clustering 
DBSCAN 
System 
Compromise 
66 61 (92.4%) 62 (93.9%) 
IRC 
Communication 
2 2 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Malicious File 
Download 
1 1 (100%) 1 (100%) 
Port Scan 13 13 (100%) 8 (61.5%) 
 
Tables 7-21 and 7-22 present the performance results of Hierarchical clustering and 
DBSCAN clustering in comparison with the results reported by Sqalli et al. [19] along 
with the percentage success. The results calculated by the automatic clustering algorithms 
showed performance  comparable to the anomaly detection technique used by Sqalli et al. 
[19], with the added advantage of automation of the whole anomaly detection process. In 
this way, we can analyze very large network trace files in very limited time by using the 
clustering algorithms. The detailed analysis of these results along with the future 
recommendations is discussed in the Chapter 8.  
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CHAPTER 8                                                                                    
Conclusion and Future Work 
Honeypots are deployed to have a better understanding of the network attacks and 
network intrusions. So, analyzing the data produced by the Honeypots becomes a 
pivotal step in the understanding of the network attacks. We can easily relate the 
success of a Honeypot to the amount of data successfully analyzed and the network 
attack information extracted from the Honeypot data. The main focus of this thesis is 
to use an anomaly detection technique alongside with the automatic clustering of the 
detected anomalies. In this thesis, we used an anomaly detection technique which 
uses a combination of the volume and IP based features to calculate the entropy or 
volume values of the following selected features: 
 Destination Port Entropy 
 Source Port Entropy 
 Destination IP Entropy 
 Total Payload Bytes 
 Total Packet Count 
Once the entropy and log of volume values are calculated, these values are passed 
as input to the two clustering algorithms, i.e., DBSCAN and Hierarchical clustering. Both 
112 
clustering algorithms are implemented separately and their output is compared, to find 
out which clustering algorithm is a better candidate to use as an automatic clustering 
algorithm for anomaly detection in Honeynets.  
Initially, we used some training datasets to check the suitability of the clustering 
algorithms and find the best combination of different tuning parameters. Initial 
experiments with the training datasets proved that the clusters created by the clustering 
algorithms are very much similar to the anomalies detected by the manual analysis of the 
entropy and volume values. Then, we applied both clustering algorithms to the unknown 
datasets and compared the results with the reported anomalies available in the datasets as 
well as those reported in earlier work.  
Our first and major contribution for thesis work is to develop a framework for the 
automatic cluster creation for the known anomalies based on their threshold values for 
each traffic feature. To develop this framework, we implemented two different clustering 
algorithms, Hierarchical Clustering and DBSCAN Clustering. Both algorithms were 
successful in identifying different anomalies from the unknown datasets. Another 
contribution of our work is the improvement of the time required to detect anomalies for 
any new dataset. This also minimizes the human input in the process of analyzing dataset 
and detecting anomalies present in it. If we use Hierarchical Clustering then the whole 
process is automated, and no human input is required. While for using DBSCAN, the 
only human input required is in providing the tuning parameters, Epsilon and Minimum 
Points.  
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8.1  FUTURE WORK 
The work presented in this thesis can be extended, so that it can provide more 
accurate and complete detection of different kinds of anomalies. Some ideas for future 
work are listed below. 
  A large dataset of known anomalies can be created by using different training 
datasets. This will help us to increase the detection rate as well as the accuracy 
of the detected results.  
 The antivirus companies and security analysts create defenses against new 
malwares by reverse engineering the network trace files. Our proposed 
anomaly detection mechanism can also be very helpful in pointing to some 
interesting segments in the network trace file, as each cluster member can lead 
directly to the time window where the actual attack has happened. This 
becomes very useful in case of very large trace files which are normally very 
difficult to reverse engineer because of the large number of packets as well as 
the long duration of the trace.  
 The amount of information provided by each cluster can be increased by 
adding more feature information with each data element, i.e., time 
information. By using the time distribution and the placement of the data 
elements inside the clusters, we can detect multiple attacks of the same type 
inside a particular cluster. And this will also help to create more resilient 
attack signatures. 
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 In this thesis, we applied both clustering algorithms separately from each 
other. In future, we can look at the possibility of having these two clustering 
algorithms working in cascade or in some other possible combination, in such 
a way that the output of one clustering algorithm could become the input for 
the other clustering algorithm. This may help us in fine tuning the cluster 
boundaries. 
8.2  LIMITATIONS 
The first drawback which we faced using the DBSCAN is its inability to detect the 
sparse anomalies. Sparse anomalies do not have the required minimum number of data 
points inside the neighborhood radius to create a DBSCAN cluster. In this case, 
DBSCAN does not create a cluster for the sparse anomaly, but instead it considers that 
particular anomaly as a noise.  
The second drawback came in the use of Hierarchical clustering, as it successfully 
detected most of the anomalies but it was unable to differentiate between two attacks of 
the same type but different intensities, or two specific attacks under a generalized 
category. This inability is due to the natural clustering criteria used in the Hierarchical 
clustering, since natural clustering criteria only create clusters when the dissimilarity 
coefficient has the maximum value.  
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